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Introduction

When a corporation needs funds for working capital, inventory, or
general operations, it can take one of two financing approaches: right hand
side (RHS) balance sheet funding or left hand side (LHS) balance sheet
funding. RHS funding methods include a firm's issuance of traditional
debt (secured and unsecured) and equity obligations, which are backed by
the general credit of the issuer. In contrast, when a firm uses an LHS
funding approach, it raises capital based upon a specific asset pool's cash
flow and value. Examples of LHS funding approaches include asset
leasing, 1 project finance, 2 factoring, 3 and the most recent financial
innovation, the securitization of financial assets.4

1. Asset leasing involves the "ttansfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a tenn in
return for consideration.• U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(j) (1994).
2. Project finance refers to a method of raising funds that relies on the value of the project being
financed and the revenues generated. Typically, the project developer or borrower is a "single purpose
entity whose only asset is the project being financed." Jonathan Birenbaum, ·Credit and Related
Documentation for Project Fuumce Transactions, In PROJECT FINANCING 1993: DOMESTIC AND
INlERNATIONAL, at 269, 271 ( PU Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 672,
1993).

3. Factoring originated in England in the fourteenth cennuy as a way for textile manufacturers to
liquidate their accounts receivable. Holders ofaccounts receivable sold them at a discount and without
recourse to a "faetor." In most cases, the factor accepted the account receivable's credit risk and rook
control of the accounts' collection. This beneflned the manufacturer in two ways: (I) the manufacrurer
did not have to review the credit of its customers, and (2) it enabled the manufacrurer to liquidate assets
quickly so that it was able to purchase more raw materials. See generally Peter H. Wei!, Factoring,
in ASsET-BASED LENDING INCLUDING COMMEROAL FINANCE AND ACQUISITION FINANCING 1988, at
41 ( PU Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 443, 1988). Factors made their
money by purchasing only the highest quality receivables-those with the greatest chance of full
payment-at a substantial discount. See Harper v. Uoyd's Factors, Inc., 214 F.2d 662, 663 (2d Cir.
1954) (stating that the usual factoring commission was 15%); see also Monon M. Scult, Accounts
Receivable Financing: Operational Patterns Under the Unifonn Commercial Code, 1 I ARiz. L. REv.
I (1969) (discussing both factoring and accounts receivable financing as pre-UCC methods of
financing).
.
4. The tenn "asset securitization• will be used in this Article interchangeably with the tenns
"structured finance transaction," "asset-backed arrangements, • "asset-backed imancing," "asset

securitization," and "structured securitized credit."
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Quite a few articles have appeared in the legal and financial journals
on the subject of securitization,5 and implicit in much of this literature is
the message that securitization transactions are efficient. This literature has
invariably viewed these transactions from the perspective of the originator
and the other transaction participants; its conclusion with respect to the
efficiency of securitization is hardly surprising. The literature has not ade
quately considered the perspective of third parties-specifically, the per
spective of the originators' unsecured creditors.
Viewing these transactions from an unsecured creditor's perspective
is important because unsecured creditors are harmed when an originator
sells its most valuable assets. In the event of bankruptcy, the originator's
residual estate, available for pro rata distribution to unsecured creditors,
likely will not include the securitized assets. 6 If the originator has used or
spent the consideration it received from the sale of the securitized assets,
its unsecured creditors will receive no benefit from the value of these
assets. 7
Predictably, bankruptcy trustees will use aggressive and creative tech
niques to try to recapture previously transferred assets. 8 As an increasing
5. See, e.g., 1liE AssET SECUR111ZATION HANDBOOK (Phillip L. Zweig ed., 1989); AssET
SECURITIZATION: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Joseph Jude No non & Paul
R. Spellmaneds., 199!); I TAMAR FRANKEL, SECUR111ZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL
AssET POOLS, AND AssEr·BACKED SECUR111ES (1991); THE GLOBAL AssET BACKED SECUR111ES
MARKEr: STRUCTURING, MANAGING AND ALLoCATING RISK (Charles A. Stone etal. eds., 1993); THE
HANDBOOK OF AssET-BACKED SECUR111ES (Jess Ledennan ed., 1990); MORTGAGE AND AssET
SECURITIZATION (Roben Lawrence Kuhn ed., 1990); JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO,
SECUR111ZATION OF CREDIT: INSIDE THE NEW TECHNOLOGY OF FINANCE (1988); SECUR111ZATION OF
FINANCIAL AssETS (Jason H.P. Kravin ed., 2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1997 ); Stephen I. Glover, Structured
Finance Goes Chapter 11: Asset Securitization by Reorganizing Companies, 47 Bus. LAw. 611 (1992);
Harold H. Goldberg et al., Asset Securitization and Corporate Financial Health, I. APPUED CoRP.
FIN., Fall 1988, at 45; Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1061, 1065 (1996); James A. Rosenthal & Juan M. Ocampo, Analydng the Economic Benefits
ofSecuritized Credit, I. APPUED CoRP. FIN., Fall !988, at 32; Steven L. Schwan:z, The Alchemy of
Asset Securitization, I STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. !33 (1994) (hereinafter Schwan:z, Alchemy]; Steven
L. Schwan:z, Structured Finance: The New Way to Securitize Assets, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 607 (1990)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Structured Frnance]; Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset
Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TExAs L. REv. 1369 (1991); The
Comm. on Bankr. and C01pomte Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y.,
Structured Frnancing Techniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527 (1995) [hereinafter Structured Fmancing

Techniques].
6. The Bankruptcy Code was enacted through the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Slat. 2549 (1978). Section S4I(a) of the Bankruptcy Code slates that an eslate is
created upon the commencement of the bankruptcy case. See II U.S.C. § S4I(a) (1994). As pan of
the Bankruptcy Code's liquidation and asset distribution procedure, that property deemed to be a pan
of the debtor's bankruptcy eslate, and not collateral securing a secured creditor's claim, is liquidated
and distributed to the general unsecured creditors. See id. § 726(a); DAVID G. EPsrEIN ET AL.,
BANKRUPTCY 4 (1994).
7. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
8. Section S44(a) of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee so-called "strong arm powers," which
include .the power to avoid cenain transfers of property made by the debtor prior to bankruptcy. II
U.S.C. § S44(a).

598

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 76:595

number of financially marginal firms securitize an increasingly exotic array
of assets and subsequently enter bankruptcy, 9 courts may be persuaded by
trustees' legal, economic, and equitable arguments to unwind the securiti
ution transaction and preserve the assets for the benefit of the bankruptcy
underdogs-the unsecured creditors. Although neither trustees nor bank
ruptcy courts have the power or authority to unwind a transaction in the
absence of adequate grounds, if the transaction results in significant harm
to a firm's unsecured creditors at a time when the firm is in a precarious
financial position, bankruptcy judges, in the exercise of their equitable
discretion, will rely on existing equitable doctrines and may expansively
interpret these doctrines to support their decisions to invalidate these
transactions. 10 When this occurs, there will be a drastic adjustive reaction
in the market for asset-backed securities.
This Article identifies the possible challenges to the claim of structured
finance's efficiency and examines the potential equitable bases for a court's
avoidance of these transactions. Part II defines structured finance and
describes the nature of the current market for asset-backed securities. Part
ill outlines the benefits that securitiution provides to originators and other
transaction participants. Part IV outlines and discusses the debate on the
efficiency of secured transactions, applies the substance of this debate to
structured finance transactions, and then examines the equitable challenges
that may be made to avoid securitized asset transfers. Finally Part V illus
trates how the rapid expansion of the securitiution market has subjected
transaction participants and third parties to mounting uncertainty.
This Article begins a discussion of these issues-it provides no defini
tive answers. This Article predicts, however, that further research will
support the conclusion that securitiution is an inefficient transaction.
Securitiution's structure is designed to divert value away from the
originator, in the absence of any compensating controls on either the
consideration received in exchange for the asset sale, or the debtor's
behavior. The originator enjoys the benefits of this distributional
inefficiency, at the expense of its unsecured creditors.
This Article further predicts that courts, in the name of equity, will
more carefully examine these transactions' structures in connection with
their supervision of an originator's bankruptcy case. When the effects of
these transactions on the recovery of unsecured creditors are fully recog
nized, courts and legislators will take steps to regulate these transactions
to address this distributional inefficiency.
9. See Suzanne Woolley, What's Next, Bridge Tolls? Almost Any Risk Can Be Securitized-But
Quality May Be ljfy, Bus. WK., Sept. 2, !996, at 64 ("'When evezybody wants to securitize, and

evezyone is willing to buy, and cvczyone thinks nothing will go wrong, there gets to be a· feeding
atmosphere, and you have to remain cautious,' says Paul Stevenson, managing director of
Moody's Investors Service Inc.'s Asset-Backed Finance group.").
10. See discussion infra notes 209-79 and accomoanving text.
frenzy
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Experiential and empirical evidence is needed before unqualified con
clusions can be drawn concerning the effects of securitization on unsecured
creditors. 11 Further exploration of the effects of securitization on other
participants in the credit markets will become increasingly important as
more originators face the prospect of bankruptcy and as more trustees and
bankruptcy courts have the opportunity to scrutinize these transactions
aggressively.
ll.

Structured Finance Defined

Securitization has been defined as a "structured process whereby loans
and other receivables are packaged, underwritten, and sold in the form of
securities." 12 The firm originally owning and selling the receivables is

11. Empirical research, as with most types of research, begins with the identification of a problem.
The problem this Anic!e identifies is a distributional inefficiency experienced by the unsecured creditors
ofa securitizing finn. Since, ultimately, courts and legislators' policy choices concerning securitization
will have profound societal effectS, such policies must be supponcd by empirical evideocc of the
inefficiencies. This kind of empirical study requires complicated fact finding and analysis of a host of
variable factors. Those variables that must be carefully identified and studied include: (1) the incidence
ofinsolvency among securitiaing finns; (2) the interest rate chaQ!ed by secured creditors of securitizing
finns; (3) the interest rate charged by unsecured creditors of securitizing finns; (4) the incidence of
default payment to unsecured creditors by securitiaing firms; and (5) the dividend paid to unsecured
creditors of liquidating finns. The results of this study must be compared to a "control group" of
similarly situated finns who utilize secured credit as a method of financing. To be truly valuable to
those chaQ!ed with sccuritization·rclated policymaking, such a study ought to be designed by those
trained in the quantitative and statistical social sciences. Then: will be an extraordinal)' number of
variables to account for, given the complexity of these transactions and the type offinns that commonly
originate them, the great variation among the finns' capital structures, and the dearth of publicly avail
able information regarding the fmancial and economic circumstances surrounding these transactions.
Such challenges, however, should not overshadow the need for policy-informing studies, or chill the
enthusiasm of those who, trained in the appropriate research methods, engage in them. See Teresa A.
Sullivan et al., The Use ofEmpirical Data in FormuiDting Bankruptcy Policy, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1987, at 195, 196 (theorizing that "empirical research is vitally needed in the formation
of bankruptcy policy"); if. Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue
Between the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 347, 348-49 (1995) (aQ!Uing that if
law professors conduct more empirical research that focuses on the actual effect law has on society,
the "gap" between the legal academy and the legal profession would narrow significantly); Howard A.
Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and
Assessment, !1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335,352 (1995) (concluding that empirical studies of transaction
cost economics prove that its predictions are usually accurate). See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995) (explaining why law has not fol
lowed the path ofother academic disciplines in adopting a natural science model ofempirical inquil)').
12. ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 5, at 3. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) does not, however, define the tenn "receivables." For purposes of this Article, the term receiv
ables will mean payment obligations--such as accounts, geoeral intangibles, or chattel paper-owed to
a company from a third party. The UCC does define both "account" and "general intangibles.•
U.C.C. § 9-106 (1994). Ac~ording to the UCC, an "account" is "any right to payment for goods sqld
or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether
or not it has been earned by performance. • Id. "General intangibles" an: "any personal property

600

Texas Law Review

[VoL 76:595

a financing-seeking firm, commonly referred to as the "originator, " 13 and
the purchasing and securities issuing entity is generally an affiliated special
purpose corporation (SPC). 14 SPCs are generally organized in one of two
forms: either as a "pay-through" entity or as a "pass-through" entity. A
pay-through entity is the transferee of receivables and the issuer of fixed
income securities. The return on these securities is based upon the trans
ferred receivables' anticipated cash flow. A pass-through entity is typically
a type of trust that serves as a conduit for the sale of the receivables to
investors, with the receivables' payments merely passing through the
trust. 15
The sale of the receivables by an originator to an SPC returns a lump
sum cash payment to the originator. 16 Once sold, the receivables' debtors
pay on their accounts, either directly to the SPC as servicer, or through a
servicing agent who in turn transfe~ the payment to the SPC. 17 The SPC

(including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments,
invesnnent properly, and money." Id. Further, the UCC defmes "chattel paper" as "a writing or
writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific
goods." ld. § 9-105(b).
Other definitions of "securitization" include: (1) "the ttansformation of an illiquid asset into a
tradeable security with a secondary market?"' Changes in Our Financial System: Globalization of

Capital Markets and Securitiztltion of.Credit: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, IOOth Cong., at 177 (1988) (statement of Prof. David A. Walker, Georgetown
University) (cited in Shenker & Colleua, supra note 5, at 1373); (2) the trend toward fmancial assets
being securities rather than loans, see Tim S. Campbell, Innovations in Financial Intermediation, Bus.
HORIZONS, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at70, 71-73; and (3) a process whereby ttaded instruments such as bonds,
notes, and certificates of deposit are substituted for direct borrowing from financial institutions, see
Cooper, Innovations: New Market Instruments, OXFORD REv. EcON. POL'Y, Winter 1986, at I, 3. In
her treatise, Professor Tamar Frankel broadly defines securitization as the ttansformation of an asset
into securities. See I FRANKEL, supra note 5, § 1.1. This definition includes both loan participations
as well as the substitution of securities for loans. While much of the discussion in this Article may be
applicable to loan participations, the primary focus will be on ttansactions involving the raising offunds
in the public and private markets through the issuance of securities backed by pools of assets.
13. Firms can originate such transactions when they have earnings in the form of cash flow from
medium- to long-term obligations owed to them by debtors. Securitized assets commonly have stan
dardized terms, uniform underwriting standards, and both delinquency probability and value that are
capable of estimation. See Shenker & CoUeua, supra note 5, at 1376 & n.25.
14. I SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL AssErs, supra note 5, § 2.02, at 2-13 (defming a special
purpose vehicle as a "corporation, trust, or other person organized for a specific purpose, the activities
of which are limited to those appropriate to accomplish such purpose, and the structure of which is
designed to insulate the vehicle to some degree from the credit risk of an originator or seller of
financial assets").
15. See I FRANKEL, supra note 5, § 1.1; see also infra note 288 (discussing a new trust entity
created by statute, the Fmancial Asset Securitization lnvesnnent Trust (FASIT)).
16. See Joan Barmat, Securitiztltion: An Overview, in THE HANDBOOK OF AssET-BACKED
SECURITIES, supra note 5, at 3, 9 (diagraming pay- and pass-through structures).

17. The servicer is the entity that receives payment from the securitized receivables' debtors. This
entity may be the originator or may be a non-affiliated entity conttacted specifically to perform the
servicing function. If the servicing entity is not rated as highly as the ABS, rating agencies require
some further protective devices. For example, Standard & Poor's requires payment made to the
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issues securities backed by the receivables' cash flow {known as asset
backed securities or ABS) to investors in the capital markets. 18
Asset-backed securities can be roughly characterized as either real
estate related or non-real-estate related. 19 Real-estate related asset-backed
securities, known as mortgage-backed securities, or MBS, are securities
backed by the payments on loans secured by residential or commercial real
estate. 20 Non-real-estate ABS are backed by the cash flow on any non
real-estate related receivables. 21

investors' trustee within 48 hours of receiving the payments, and Moody's requires that there he a
substirute serviceravailable if the original scrvicerfails. SeeM. Douglas Watson, Jr. & Stephen Joynt,
Ro.tingAsset-BackedTransaaions,in1l!EASsETSECURITlZATlONHANDBOOK,supranoteS,at22S-29.
18. These securities may he either privately placed or sold in the public markets. See Lowell L.
Bryan, Structured Securitized Credil:A SuperiDrTechnologyforLending, J. APPUED CoRP. FIN., Fall
1988, at 6 (noting that although public issuers dominate, the number of private issuers is increasing).
19. See generally WilliAM W. BARTI.E'IT, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: PRooucrs,
ANALYSIS, TRADING 54-79 (1989).
20. See id.
21. The clear market distinction between mortgage-backed and all other asset-backed securities
tr.msactions can he traced to the difference in the respective market's historical development. The
mortgage market has historically been the largest user of long-term credit. When the "credit crunch"
of the 1960s decreased the funds available for residential real estate purchases, the secondary mortgage
market flourished. See id. at 7. Although the real estate market is comprised of many different public
and private players, the central asset that drives this securities market remains the single-family home
and the corresponding loan and mortgage. See id. at 54-55. In the most basic formulation, shifts in
the secondary mortgage market and the market for mortgage-backed securities correspond to the behav
ior of homeowners. as well as the economic and interest rate realities at a particular time. See
gen.ral/y id.
As the government-insured and guaranteed securities market developed, private sector lenders
increasingly saw the advantages of selling off both their residential and commercial real estate loans
in the secondary market. As a result, lenders interested in securitizing their real-estate-related assets
tried to address investor concerns regarding portfolio quality and documentation uniformity.
Consequently, uniform legal documentation for conventional loans for real estate purchases became
more common, further facilitating the sale of these loans to secondary market investors. See Andrew
Lance, Balancing Private and Public Initiatives in the Mortgage-Backed Security Market, 18 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 426, 438 (1983); Michael E. Stone, Housing and the Dynamics of U.S.
Capitalism, in CRITICAL PERsPECTIVES ON HOUSING 56 (Rachel E. Bratt ed., 1986).
In 1984, the federal government once again supported and encouraged active trading in the sec
ondary mortgage market by enacting the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act (SMMEA).
See Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and IS
U.S.C. (1988)); Shenker & Colletta, supra noteS, at 1385. This Act was designed to further facilitate
the market for mortgage-backed securities by removing some of the legal impediments to the issuance
ofprivate mortgage-backed securities. The SMMEA removes legal impediments to the issuance of pri
vate mortgage-backed securities in four principal ways. First, it permits depository institutions to invest
in privately issued, mortgage-related securities (as that term is defined in the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(41) (1994)). See 12 U.S.C. § 24, at 9 (1994); id. § l7S7(7)(E).
Second, it preempts certain state legal-investtnent laws thereby permitting state-regulated institutions
to invest in mortgage-related securities, see IS U.S.C. § 77r-I(a) (1994), althougb a number of states,
including Arkansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, South Dakota, Utah, and West Vilginia, have
overridden SMMEA preemption of its legal investtnent laws. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 5,
at !385 (citing Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.

's
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The market for non-real-estate-related asset-backed securities
is relatively new compared to the MBS market. 22 The early non
real-estate-related, quasi-securitizations involved the issuance of standard
accounts-receivable-backed commercial paper fuily supported by
letters of credit. 23 Foiiowing these early transactions, firms became
increasingly more creative and began securitizing automobile loans,
leases, and credit card receivables. 24 As the market for ABS has
expanded in recent years, issuers have become even more imaginative
Examples of
with respect to the type of receivables securitized.
recently issued ABS include bond issuances backed by unpaid real
estate taxes, 25 securities backed by hotel and hospitality receivables,26
taxi cab medallion-backed securities,7:1 securities backed by the excess
spread from previously issued credit card securitizations,28 securities

and 15 U.S.C.)). Third, it preemptS state blue sky laws by exempnngmongage·relatedsecurities from
registration under state securities laws to the same extent that securities issued or guanmteed by the
government or a related agency or instrumentality are exempt. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r-l(c). Fourth, it
amended § 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by permitting delayed delivery of mortgage-related
securities under certain conditions, thereby allowing a forward-trading marlcet to develop. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 78g(g), 78h(a), 78k(d)(l). These developments have resulted in significant increases in the
capital available to the residential housing market. See Shenker & CoUetta, supra note 5, at 1386.
22. See William J. Haley, SecuririzPtion Teclmiquesfor Non-MongageAssels, in MORTGAGE AND
AssET SECURITIZATION 216, 216 (Robert Lawrence Kuhn ed., 1990); Barmat, supra note 16, at 14.
23. See ROSENTHAL & OcAMPO, supra note 5, at 26.
24. The asset-backed securities matket saw its real start in 1985 when the Spetry Corporation orig
inated the first true structured finance transaction, in which it sold, through a special purpose
corporation, $192 million lease-backed notes in the public markets. General Motors Acceptance
Corporation foUowed the Spetry deal with its securitization of more than $8 billion between late 1985
and 1986. Three investment banking firms, First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Drexel Burnham
Lambert captured the bulk of the lucrative commissiolis from these deals. Seeing an opportunity to
expand into this marlcet, at least 14 major investment banks, including Goldman, Sacbs & Co., Mertill
Lynch, Dean Witter Reynolds, Kidder Peabody, and the investment banking units of Cibbank and
Chemical Bank began aggressively seeking asset-backed security issuances to underwrite. See Btyan,
supra note 18, at 4-5; Structured Ftna11cing Techniques, supra noteS, at 538-39.
25. New York City raised $208 million in a AAA-rated public bond offering backed by $1.5
billion in unpaid real estate taxes. In 1993, Jersey City, New Jersey was the first municipality to raise
fonds in the markets backed by unpaid teal estate taxes. See Big Apple is Second City to Securitize Tax
Liens; Chemical Underwriles Successor to Jersey City Deal, iNVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., June 27,
1994, at 13. It has been predicted that the "municipal tax lien securitization matket will grow to at
least $S billion a year." as governments get out of the tax collection business. Amy B. Resnick, Tax
lien Markel Is Sel to Take-off. Industry Players Say, BOND BUYER 1996, available in 1996 WL
564443. Securitization of tax liens offers municipalities the opportunity to raise cash and clean their
balance sheets. See id.
26. See Ken Wilson, Hotel Ftna11cing Returns; Securitization Provides Vehicle, 209 HOTEL &
MOTEL MGMT., Mar. 21, 1994, at 25, 2S (noting that securitization of hqtel receivables could result
in a $1 billion capital infosion into the hotel industry by 1996).
27. See Myth Becomes Reality: Taxi Cab Medallions Securitized, AssET SALES REP., Dec. 19,
1994, at l.
28. The collateral in this deal consisted of a portion of the difference between the interest mte on
the underlying loans and coupons on the previously issued asset-backed security. See Jeanne Burke,
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backed by health-care receivables,29 and securities backed by government
contract receivables. 30
In addition, new types of entities have been originating securitization
transactions in recent years. Many banks, thrifts, and finance companies,
at the urging of investment bankers, have transitioned from being
"portfolio lenders " 31 to being substantial issuers of asset-backed
securities. 32 Similarly, business entities with poor credit ratings and those

First USA Securitizes Excess Spread, PRIVATE PLACEMENT REP., June27, 1994, at4, available in 1994
WL3272622.
29. See New Prescription/or ABS Market, TREAsuRY MANAGER'S REP., Mar. 1, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 7867346 (reporting that a pharmacy group pooled $500 million in pharmacy receivables
and issued ABS). For a comprehensive discussion of health care receivable fmancing, see Cathy M.
Kaplan,SecuritizationofNon-Tradiliolll1lAssets,inNEWDEVELOPMENTSINSECURITIZATION23l(PU
Real Estate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. N-385, 1992).
30. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 250-58. Other creative securitization products include the
following: (1) The U.S. Postal Service, American Express, and Daiwa Corp. created a special-purpose
corporation to sell bonds in the structured-finance markets backed by the money orders sent by Mexican
inmtigrants to their families in Mexico. See Anne Schwimmer, Post Office, Amex Securitize Money
Orders Sent to Merica: Daiwa Raises $100 Million in Unusual ABSDeal, INVESJMENT DEALERS' DIG.,
July 4, 1994, at 12. (2) Citicorp issued bonds backed by a cash stream of money predicted to be spent
by tourists in Jamaica. See id. The legal issue with respect to these securitized assets was whether a
"money future" is deemed to be an "account" under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. For
a discussion of the unsettled nature of the law relating to securitization, ue infra Part V. (3) Harley
Davidson, Inc., securitized $21 minion of motorcycle loan receivables in 1994 through a private place
ment of debt securities. See Harley-Davidson Returns with Triple-A Deal, AssET SALES REP., June
27, 1994, at 6, available in 1994 WL 3765508. (4) A relatively complex securitization of the cash
flow proceeds from corporate jet sales subjected investors to the contingencies in the payment flow of
the receivables and, thus, offered them high yields in exchange for increased risk. See John Hintze,
Bombardier Drops Off-Balance Sheet Deal with Hot Spread, AssET SALES REP•• June 29, 1990, at 5.
(5) The Pacific Lumber Co. has issued notes backed by the expected revenue from the sale of timber.
See Structured F'lllfJJicing Techniques, supra note 5, at 539 (noting that this issuance is "[p]etbaps the
most unusual transaction to date"). (6) David Bowie had bonds issued that were backed by future
royalties from his old songs. See Andrew Fraser, Staid Prudential Racks with Ziggy, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Feb. 15, 1997. at 6D ("They allow Bowie to coUect $55 million up front instead of waiting
for the royalty checks to trickle in over many years. They provide Prudential with a 7.9 percent return
on its invesanent over 10 years-an even higher return than the 6.37 percent yield on the new 10-year
Treasuzy note."); see also Woolley, supra note 9, at 64 (describing securitization as a "red hot
financing technique," and listing new asset types securitized to include security alarm conttacts, student
loans, mutual fund fees, delinquent child-support payments, royalty Streams from films, home
improvement loans, and suggesting that "parking tickets and bridge tolls may be next").
31. A portfolio lender is a lender that makes loans and holds them in its own portfolios as assets
to earn the interest paid by borrowers. See Robert I. Reich & Charles W. Sewright, Jr., The Bank
Rate, in 1l!E AssET SECURITIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 385.
32. Although banks have historically sold loans to free up cash and increase their liquidity, fol
lowing bank deregulation the sale ofentire loan portfolios accelerated. Deregulation increased competi
tion among banks; as a result, banks had greater trouble anracting deposits to maintain the liquidity and
reserve levels necessazy for active lending programs. This led banks to view more favorably the prac
tice of selling their loans to raise cash for continued lending. See id. at 386. 1n 1985, Marine Midland
Bank in partn~hip with Salomon Brothers issued the first norunortgage receivable-backed securities.
The Certificate of Automobile Receivables (CARS) grantor trust was created to issue securities in a pri
vate placement backed by consumer automobile loans. Later that year, Valley National Bank together
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entities who, because of high interest rates, are reluctant to borrow money
conventionally from banks are increasingly turning to securitization as a
way to secure capital at lower cost.33
Recently, the ABS market was characterized by one market observer
as one of "increased competition, greater volume and [one that is
increasingly trading in] exotic asset classes. " 34 The substantial volume of
ABS issuances has been attributed to "an almost insatiable appetite for new
offerings. " 35
This appetite has resulted in substantial profit being realized by many
of the securitization transaction participants. 36 The list of participants
includes the originator, the asset transferee, the rating agency or
agencies,37 the financial institution or other type of insurer for the purpose
of providing credit enhancement, 38 an entity charged with the
responsibility of servicing the credit,39 a trustee as representative of the
security holders, counsel for the originator and underwriters, accountants,

with First Boston issued securitized automotive receivable-backed securities to the public. Since 1985,
billions of dollars in automotive loans and credit card receivables have been sold in stnlctured
securitized r;ansactions. See id. at 388.
33. The annual issuance ofsecurities backed by assets other than mortgages increased from slightly
over $1 billion in 1985 to almost $43 billion by the end of 1990. See Franklin D. Dreyer, Address
Before the Subcomntittee on Policy, Research and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (July 31, 1991), in FED. REsERVE BULL., Sept. 1,
1991, at 7, available in 1991 WI.. 2861665. According to Chase Securities, $111 billion in asset
backed securities were sold on the public markets through September 30, 1996, and $7.5 billion of ABS
were sold on the private market through that date. See Aaron Elstein, Merrill Sees Danger In Surging
Growth ofAsset-Backed Market, AM. BANKER, OcL 2, 1996, at 24. Because of the increasing popular
ity of stnlctured financing as an alternative to traditional commercial lending, banks, investment banks,
and other financial Institutions---including Citicorp (the ground-breaker in issuing asset-backed
commercial paper), Bankers Trust, First Boston Corp., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, and Salomon
Brothers-have developed expertise in stnlctured finance transactions and have created depanments
specializing in securitizations. See Michael Liebowitz, Can Corporate America Securilize Itself,
INvEsTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 27, 1992, at 14.
34. Private Market Dotes on Exotic Asset Classes, INs. ACCT., Sept. 16, 1996, at 1, available in
1996 WI.. 11827605.
35. Elstein, supra note 33, at 24.
36. See John C. Edmunds, Securities: The New World Wealth Machine, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall
1996, at 118, 118 (1996) (stating that securitization has become the most powerful engine of wealth
creation in today's world economy).
37. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
38. Credit enhancement devices include letters of credit, private insurance, guarantees, or other
payment assurances. Credit enhancement is designed to ensure that payment will be made on the issued
securities as they become due. if there is a payment shortfall on the underlying assets, the SPC draws
upon the credit enhancement and pays investors from this draw. Rating agencies, in employing what
they refer to as the "weak link policy," will not raCe asset-backed securities higher than the credit rating
of the third-party provider of the credit enhancement. See William J. Curtin & Stephen H. Deckoff.
Asset-Backed Securities: An AttractiveAddition to the Low-Duration SeC/or ofthe F'txed Income Market,
in THE HANDBOOK OF AssET-BACKED SECU!!ITIES, supra note 5. at 195, 204, 203~.
39. See supra note 17.
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the underwriters responsible for placing the ABS issuance, 40 the ABS
traders, and the ABS investors. 41 The extent to which third parties exper
ience corresponding negative effects from the proliferation of these transac
tions is an issue not yet well explored.
Although securitization can take many forms, this Article wiii focus
on the most common model or prototype of securitization. Such a struc
ture assumes that the originator is a corporation and the assets securitized
are accounts receivable. Such a structure also assumes that the SPC is a
corporate subsidiary of the originator formed for the exclusive purpose of
purchasing the originator's pool of assets and then issuing securities backed
by these assets in either the public or private markets. 42

ill. Why Firms Securitize Assets
Firms securitize their assets for the same reason firms borrow money:
to raise money for either special projects or working capital. 43 Rational
firms choosing to securitize their assets rather than use them as collateral
for a secured loan conclude, on balance, that securitization's net benefits
exceed the benefits of the possible financing alternatives. 44 These benefits
include improving liquidity, increasing diversification of funding sources,
lowering the effective interest rate, improving risk management, and
achieving accounting-related advantages. 45 Further, firms may securitize
their assets because of the persuasive influence of professional advisors

40. See Woolley, supra note 9, at 64 (asserting that, according to the head ofSilU!dard & Poor's
New Assets group, Calvin R. Wong, "There is a huge invesnnent-banking comrnunii;Y going after
[securitization] business and an insatiable demand from investors").
41. See RosENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra noteS, at 12-17.
42. Variations on this protoi;Ype include: (1) the use of Multi-Seller Vehicles (MSVs), which are
SPCs created specifically to purchase and fund receivables portfolios from a variecy of originators and
are not subsidiaries of their originators (for bankruptcy-remote puipOses, the SPC may be a subsidiary
of the invesnnent bank or underwriter); and (2) originators in the form of partnerships, limited liabilii;Y
companies, banks, thrifts, or any other enticy holding eligible receivables. See generally The Lure of
Multi-Seller Vehicles, CORP. FIN., Oct. 1994 (Supp.), at 6.
43. See 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASsETS, supra noteS, § 1.01, at 1·3 to -8 (suggesting
that the general puipOse of securitization is to effect business financing, and descnoing more particular
secondary goals as well).
44. See Meredith S. Iackson,Leap ofFaith:Asset-BasedLending to Asset-Backed Securitkation-A
Case Study, STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN., Winter 1996, at193 (discussing in the context of a case study
some of the challenges faced by securitizing originators, as well as the potential benefits).
4S. In a recent article entitled The Death ofliability, Professor Lynn LoPucki offered another
reason firms may decide to securitize their assets: to judgment-proof themselves. Professor LoPucki
characterized asset securitization as both a • substitute for borrowing and a powerful new strategy for
judgment proofing," and described a model in which a coipOration sells its assets and distnl>ures them
to its shareholders in the form of dividends. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death ofliability, 106 YALE L.J.
1, 24 (1996), (footnote ontitted). The coipOration then leases back the assets and coJllinucs to operate
as it did prior to the securitization, except that the corporation, now devoid of assets, is completely
judgment proof. See id. at 2S·26.
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who stand to benefit financially from an increasing number of securitization
transactions.

A.

Trends in the Financial Industry
In recent years, securitization has become quite trendy,46 and trends

in the financial industry are as influential as trends in other market sectors.
Trends are driven by industry leaders, and in the financial services sector,
the leaders have had significant power and influence. 47 When a firm is
seeking financing, it will in most cases seek the advice of legal counsel and
financial advisors. In many cases, these advisors counsel their clients to
engage in types of financing schemes with which the advisors are most
familiar at the moment and those that are the most profitable for the
advisors.48 In this way, legal advisors are able to distinguish themselves
46. See James C. Allen, lsi Union Card Issue Clears Way jar Mare Offerings, AM. BANKER,
Man:h I, 1996, at 18 ("A successful credit card securitization by First Union Corp. last week has set
the stage for a number ofcommercial banks looking to 1BP the asset-backed securities market as another
funding tool."); The Card Bond Express Keeps Picking Up Steam, CREDIT CARD NEWS, Feb. 15, 1996,
at I, available in 1996 WL 8385627 (noting that "almost nothing can dull the luster of securities
backed by credit card receivables," because, despite an "uptick in delinquencies and challle offs, 1995
proved to be another record breaking year, with securitizations totalling $43 billion, up 31% from
$32.8 billion in 1994;" further, "most observers expect a repeat performance in 1996"); Frantlines:
The Markets: ABS Issues Hit Record in 1995, PENSIONS & INVESn.!ENTS, Feb. 19, 1996, at 8 ("Asset
backed securities issuance [in 1995] shattered the prior year's record. The public asset-backed market
recorded total volume of $107.792 billion in 1995, a 42% increase from 1994's $15.925 billion.");
Have Asset, Will Securitize, TREAsuRY MANAGER's REP., July7, 1995, available in 1995 WL6849505
("Unheard of a decade ago, ABS emellled in the mid-1980s and now have became a familiar, almost
humdrum form of finance •.••").
47. Allen, supra note 46, at 18 (quoting a senior banker with CS First Boston's asset securitization
group who stated, "We expect to see an overall rise in volume of asset-backed securities by banks in
!996"); rrr Hartford Stays Bullish an ABS Opportunities, INS. Accr., Feb. 5, 1996, at 2, available
in 1996 WL 5569096 (praising ABS as "sterling" investments).
48. Securitization ttansactions have higher up-front expenses compared to RHS funding
arrangements, and the bulk of these up-front transaction costs end up in the pockets of the deal

professionals. Transaction costs include legal fees, underwriter fees, fees charged in connection with
credit enhancement, rating agency fees, accounting fees, and fmancial advisory fees. How high the
ttansaction costs are depends upon a number of factors, including the quality of the receivables to be
securitized, the necessity of credit enhancement, the type of credit enhancement, the experience of the
originator and the legal and fmancial advisors, the size of the proposed ttansaction, and the availability
of funding alternatives. Rating agencies challle sizable fees to perform the diligence necessary to ralll
a security issuance. 1n addition, because ABS are relatively new financial products, the market has
demanded that they carcy a high credit rating. This means that credit enhancement must be a compo
nent of the transaction, and credit enhancement can be very costly. The losses against which credit
enhancement protects investors include default on the underlying receivables, returns for defective or
damaged goods, discounts given by the originator for early payments, and carcying costs incurred in
connection with late payments or delinquencies. The level of credit enhancement is usually based upon
a historical ratio, in the range of three times the highest default rate over the past 12 months, or 5%
ofthe face value of the assets. If the securitization does not have sufficient credit enhancement, inves
tors musrbe compensated in the yield they receive on their investment.
1n addition, accounting and legal fees for a structured-finance ttansaction can be significant
l"Illely because of the complexity of their structure and the multitude of legal issues that must be
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from those who might recommend more traditional and less profitable
forms of financing.
Because it is an extremely time-consuming and complex undertaking
for legal and financial counselors to structure securitization transactions,
once a firm Ius completed one transaction and has developed an expertise,
the pieces are in place for that firm to participate in other similar
transactions. 49 This natural phenomenon has not only resulted in an
increasing number of originators engaging in repeat securitizations, but it
has also led to the proliferation of structured-finance boutique groups
within large law firms, so structured finance legal departments, structured
finance groups in investment banks,S1 and in the nationally recognized
statistical-rating agencies (referred to herein as rating agencies or
NRSROs). 52 These "experts" have a significant influence upon potential

addressed in !he documentation. For example, !he SPC must be formed, and boatds of directors must
be put into place. Disclosure documents must be prepared, and !he transaction must be in compliance
wilh !he governing body of law, which includes Article 9 of !he UCC, !he Securities Act of 1933 and
!he Securities Exchange Act of 1934, !he Invesnnent Company Act of 1940, and !he Internal Revenue
Code. The governing law is still evolving, and to successfully avoid legal pitfalls, a legal advisor must
be fully familiar wilh the relevant starutes and legal issues. See infra Pan V (discussing the current
unsettled state ofbolh starutory and caselaw in response to !he evolving market). As is the case with
all public security issuances, underwriting fees, financial advisory fees, and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) registration fees are also significant. These fees are not incuned when a company
uses RHS bank financing to raise capital. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Keighley, Risks in Securitisation
Transat:tions, in THE GLOBAL AssET BACKED SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 5, at 99, 100-02;
Kenneth P. Morrison, Documeming the Asset-Backed Securities Transat:tion: Managing the Process
Toward a Quality Outcome, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 1993, at 281, 300-02 ( PLI
Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 677, 1993) (explaining !he transaction costs
inherent in an ABS and suggesting ways by which a lawyer can help a client reduce unexpected cost
ovenuns); Watson &Joynt, supra now 17, at 234-35 (discussing !he functions and fees of the servicer
and !he trustee).
49. See Morrison, supra now 48, at287-88 (describing !he tension between !he complexity of these
transactions and !he need to keep costs low).
50. The WesUaw Legal Directory lists approximately 651aw firms who have identified lhemselves
as having saucrured-finance expertise. Sean:h of WL, WLD (Nov. 23, 1997 ). Saucrured-finance
legal work is best suited to laQ!e law firms due to !he many different areas of substantive expertise !he
work requires, such as familiarity wilh !he Securities Act of 1933, the Internal Revenue Code, Article
9 of the UCC, and !he Bankmptcy Code.
51. Inves1ment banks include JP MoQ!an, MOQ!an Stanley, Salomon Brolhers, CS First Boston,
and Oppenheimer. Chase Manhattan Bank and Manufacrurer Hanover Trust each have investment
banking arms. The growlh in volume, total value, and complexity of !he securitization market can be
attributed in pan to increased competition among financial advisors. Investment banks have been
motivated by !he substantial underwriting fees and trading profits earned from securitization
transactions. See Bryan, supra note 18, at 13-14 (noting !hat the expanded potential for revenue
generated by ABS has provided strong incentives for invesnnent banks to become involved); Paresh
Mashru & Mark Rhys, Asset-Backed Finance-Risk Controlfor Traders in Asset-Backed Securities, in
THE GLOBAL AssET BACKED SECURITIES MARKET, supra noteS, at217, 217 (pointing out that finan
cial advisors have recognized !hat !he increased interest-rate volatility and changing credit conditions
inherent in ABS have improved the market's potential to create earnings, sparking heightened
competition among advisors).
52. There are six nationally recognized statistical-rating OQ!anizations that all have saucrured
finance "groups" or "deparnnents": Moody's, <;tandatd & Poor's, Fitch Tnvestors, Duff & Phelps,
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originators and the originators' willingness to utilize securitization as a
funding and financing strategy. 53
Furthermore, rating agencies have significant influence on the behav
ior of a transaction originator's legal advisor and the scope of the legal
opinion prepared in connection with a transaction. 54 The rating agencies'
insistence on legal opinions that place the transaction in its most favorable
light to market investors has led, in certain instances, to a "race to the
bottom," with some law firms drawing conclusions in their opinions that
are not substantiated by the present state of the law. 55 In these times of
increasing competition and drive for profits, firms with a hunger for lucra
tive structured-finance clients may be swayed by the persuasive powers of

meA Banking Analysis. and Thomas Bankwatch. The specialists who work in these deparonents
conduct the research necessary to rate the ABS issuances. as well as to analyze the strucrure and narure
ofeach proposed transaction. The designation ofa rating instirution as an NRSRO is made by the SEC
Division of Market Regolation through the issuance of no-action letters. If a rating agency wishes the
designation of NRSRO, it sends a letter to the SEC requesting that the SEC recommend no regulatory
enforcement action against the rating agency if it designates itself an NRSRO. Formal standards for
such a designation have not been developed; the SEC instead relies on the market acceptance of rating
agencies using such designation. SeeN ationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange
Act Release Nos. 33-7085, 34-34616, 59 Fed. Reg. 46314, 46316 (Sept. 7, 1994) (noting that the
Division of Market Regulation "believes that the single most important criterion is that the rating
agency is in fact nationally recognized by the predominant users of ratings in the United States as an
issuer of credible and reliable ratings"); Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Comment, An Examina!ion of the
Cu"ent Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 579, 611 (1993); see also Gregory Husisian, Note, What Standard of Care Should
Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis ofBond Rating Agency Liability, 15 CORNELL
L. REv. 411, 424-25 (1990) (noting the market impact of agency ratings and the hands-off approach
to date by lawmakers and couns).
53. See Note, A Canceptual Framework/or Imposing Statutory Underwriter Duties Involved in the
Structuring ofPrivate lAbel Mortgage-Backed Securities, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 779,789-90 (1996)
(stating, in the mortgage-backed securities context, that compelilion in the ratings industiy may be
leading to lower rating standards because, as economically self-interested market participants, issuers
are motivated to use rating agencies that provide the most favorable rating, and thus, the lowering of
rating standards by some rating agencies has had a positive impact on those agencies' market share);
see also ROSENTIJAL & OCAMPO, supra note 5, at 13-17 (explaining that asset-backed securitization
will lead to a more efficient financial-services industty and predicting that firms that capitalize on this
new trend will benefit from the industty's evolution, while firms that lack skills or fail to adapt to the
new industty strucrure will suffer).
54. These types of legal opinions are known as "third-party opinions." In third-party opinions,
attorneys draw conclusions with respect to specific legal issues, and these conclusions may only be
relied upon by the addressee-not the public at large or even other participants in the transaction. See
Tribar Opinion Comm., Special Report by The TriBar Opinion Committee: Opinions In the Bankruptcy
Cantext: Rating Agency, Structured Financing. and Chapter II Transactions, 46 Bus. LAW. 717, 724
(1991) [hereinafter TriBar Repon].
55. Historically,lawyers have not given legal opinions on bankruptcy law; even today, bankruptcy
issues are carved out of the remedies opinion. See id. at 718. As securitization and other complex
fmancing transactions have become more common, the market(that is, rating agencies) has increasingly
begun to ·request that these kinds of opinions be issued by the transaction originator's counsel. See id.
at 719-20; infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of legal opinions

delivered in connection with securitization transactions.
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the rating agencies to offer a legal opinion that less hungry firms would not
agree to deliver.56 The financial services industry and its counterpart, the
legal community serving the financial services market, are motivated by
profit, and profit often drives decisionmaking. As Part V will discuss, this
does not always result in the greatest net benefit to the market.

B.

Improvement ofLiquidity

All originators who securitize their assets enjoy an improvement in
asset liquidity management. By definition, the process of securitization
transforms future payments into instant cash, 57 and this transformation
allows entities to recognize immediately the value of these assets for a vari
ety of uses, including current business needs. 58 The sale of assets, even
at a discount, 59 results in a lump sum cash payment to the originator.
There are many positive consequences of a firm's increased
liquidity. 60 In the case of originators with trade creditors, enhanced
liquidity may permit a more fluid cycling of inventory, thus increasing the
chance that a firm may become able to pay its suppliers' invoices as they
become due. 61 Because in many cases suppliers of inventory are
56. q. Steven Brill, Ruining the Profession, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1996, at 5 (challenging the
contention that the public dissemination of large Jaw finn profits has Jed to the decline of
professionalism among lawyers).
51. The degree of liquidity, however, depends upon the degree ofcollateralization required ofthe
asset-backed security. The transformation ofan asset worth $1000 into $1000 cash provides the issuer
with maximum liquidity. More likely~ however, conservative rnting agencies as well as risk-averse
investors would require that the asset value exceed the cash proceeds by certain specified percenrages.
For example, in a !991 securitization of computer leases by Comdisco Receivables, Inc., the principal
amount of the ABS sold represented 92% of the initial aggregate-<liscounted lease balance. S.e David
L. Gold & Julie P. Schlueter, Credit Risks ond 1heir Analysis in Asset Securitization, in 1lJE GLOBAL
AssET BACKED SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 5, at 153, 159-60 (discussing a transaction
underwritten by Salomon Brothers that featured a particularly complex credit analysis).
58. For companies with trade receivables, securitization can result in more efficient management
of a finn's cash requirements and growth-related expenses. See Glenn B. McClelland, Jr. & James W.
McDonald, Jr., Securitking Trade ondLease Receivables, in 1lJE AssET SECURITIZATION HANDBOOK,
supra note 5, at123, 130. In the case of financial institutions, securitizing Joan portfolios and other
receivables enables them to rerain the difference between the rate of return received upon the sale of
the receivables and the interest rate paid by the fmancial institution's borrowers. See Bryan, supra note
18, at 15.
59. For example, in a trade receivable-backed transaction, the SPC's
purchase of receivables from the originator is generally [made) at a discount to reflect:
[First, an] interest component for the expected payment period[; second, a] component for
dilutions, such as rerurns and wananty claims, offsets, volume discounts, early payment
credits and rebates[; and thitd, a) factor for expected losses.
Securitizing R•ceivab/es in the U.S., CoRP. FIN., Oct. 1994 (Supp.), at 28, 29. In a credit cam
receivable-backed transaction~ there is no discount for the interest component because a predetermined
finance charge is established. ld.
60•. See generally FEDERALREsERVEBANKOF N.Y., FUNDING AND LIQUIDfrY: RECENT CHANGES
IN LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT AT COMMERCIAL BANKS AND SECUR111ES FIRMS (1990).
61. Fora discussion of the extent to which creditors are paid from the cash received by a business
with a steady cash flow, see infra text accompan.nn2 nores J7n-78.
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unsecured trade creditors, this cash infusion may improve their chance of
repayment. 62
The transformation of a future payment stream into immediate cash
may further enable an originator to pursue a potentially profitable project
or merely meet its regular obligations. Cash represents generalized pur
chasing power and is needed by businesses to invest in research and
development, to pay dividends to shareholders, and to engage in other
long-term investments, 63 a need not always satisfied by a firm's erratic
payment stream of receivables. These investments, in turn, may enable a
firm to grow in profitability and, therefore, be in a better position to pay
its creditors-including its unsecured creditors-when the firm's debts
become due. Cash flow concerns are often paramount in management's
mind, and the ability to readily transform assets into cash may provide a
firm with a competitive advantage, both for long-term development plan
ning and for short-term credit problem resolution. 64

C. Diversification ofFunding Sources
Even firms ordinarily able to get financing may be able to tap a new
market of investors through securitization; individuals and institutional
investors who would not ordinarily invest in an originator directly may be
willing to invest in that originator's asset-backed securities. 65 This poten
tial market expansion is important for rapidly growing firms that have
exhausted their typical funding sources or whose typical funding sources
are offering financing at prohibitively high rates. 66
Moreover, a firm may find that due to the presence of restrictive cove
nants in the documentation of existing financing arrangements, securiti
zation is the only possible way for it to raise funds; a bad credit history or
a lack of a financial track record has a limiting effect on alternative finan
cing methods that rely on the firm's credit rating. 67

62. Even when trade creditors are secured by a floating lien on their debtor's inventory, they are
often vulnerable to inventory value fluctuations. If a debtor uses cash received upon the sale of
inventory for purposes other than paying the inventory supplier or purchasing additional inventory, the
supplier may find itself without collateral, or with collateral valued at less than the amount of the credit
extended. See LYNN M. LoPUCKI & EUZABETH WAl\REN, SECURED CREDIT; A SYSTEMS APPROACH
199 (1995).
63. See GEORGE W. GAWNGER & P. BASIL HEALY, l.JQUIDriY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT
41-42 (2d ed. 1991); WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON, CORPORATE FINANCE THEORY 29 (1997).
64. See id.
65. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 5, at 529-30 (explaining that funding
resources can be structurally isolated and thereby protect investors from bankruptcy risk). CiticoiJl and
Sears, Roebuck and Co. marketed their credit-card-backed securities to retail institutional investors.
Chrysler Credit CoiJl. marketed its auto-loan-backed securities to money market mutual funds and
medium term investors. See 1 SECUIIlT!ZATION OF FINANCIAL ASsETS, supra note 5, § 3.02[c].
66. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 5, at 529-30.
67. See Barbara A. Nunemaker, CreditRalings on IntemoJional Asset-BackedSecurities, in ASsET
SECUIUTIZATION, supra noteS at 134. 136-37.
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Diversification of funding sources may also improve the originator's
overall credit rating; a finn with a diversity of funding options generally
has somewhat higher credit quality than a firm that solely utilizes com
mercial lending financing sources. 68 Credit ratings reflect the likelihood
that investors will be repaid their investment, plus interest, on time and on
the tenns described in the transaction's offering documents, and provide
investors with a means to compare a variety of investment products. The
lower a security is rated, the higher risk it is deemed to be and thus the
higher return paid. As such, lower rated securities result in more expen
sive funding for their issuers. 69 In some cases, a firm may find it finan
cially prudent to engage in a securitization in order to improve its credit
rating and then to return to the traditional commercial finance market as a
better credit risk. 70

D.

Improved Risk Management

Risk management is often a fundamental objective of securitizing
finns. 71 Unlike traditional lending arrangements, a successful securitiz
ation is dependent upon investors' satisfaction with the quality of the assets
backing the ABS, not the credit quality of the originator. 72
In a traditional lending arrangement, the same institution originates the
loan, structures the tenns, bears the credit risk, provides the funds, and
services the collection of principal and interest.73 As such, whatever risks
the borrower offers are fully absorbed by the lender. 74 These risks
include the possibility that the value of the collateral will decline, the
potential for nonpayment or late payment of the underlying collateral, the
prospect of the borrower becoming subject to unexpected (or expected)
liability, the uncertainty of interest rate fluctuation, any fallibility
associated with the borrower's previous borrowing record, the uncertainty
associated with a limited borrowing history, and the potential of
borrower's bankruptcy. 75 These risks are commonly referred to as "event

68. See Goldbe~g et al., supra note 5, at 49 (outlining the approach taken by Moody's Investor
Service to assess the impact of securitization on the general credit qualily of originators).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 5, at 12 (descn'bing how credit securitization can lead
to a more efficient financial-services indusby).
72. See id. ("Investors in asset-backed securities are SIIUCIUrally protected from the event risk that
the originator's credit quality may deleriorate. ").
73. See id. at 6-13.
74. See id.; Rosenthal & Ocampo, supra nore 5, at 33.
75. There are some securitization strucbues, however, that provide for the originator to absorb
the first loss tranche, up to a specified level. This is most often the case when the originalor is per·
forming the servicing function. The theory behind this struclUre is that, in connection with its per·

fonnancc of the account servicing, the originator has direct contact with the receivables borrower and.
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risks. " 76 Secured lenders address the issue of risk by reviewing the
debtor's likelihood of default and evaluating the borrower's character,
repayment capacity, and economic and financial projections for the entire
term of the loan.77 This may involve the ongoing monitoring of the
debtor's business behavior and practices.
The ABS investors, in contrast to secured lenders, do not bear all of
the risks associated with the originator and its business and instead rely
upon risk-containing measures that are made a part of the transaction. 78
For example, credit enhancement allows the party providing the letter of
credit or guaranty to bear a portion of the risk of nonpayment or late
payment, in exchange for a fee. 79 In addition, when an originator secur
itizes its highest quality assets it minimizes the ABS investors' risk.
Conversely, the risk exposure of the firm's other creditors is heightened by
this asset division. 80 Furthermore, because there are no unknown or
uncertain events in the future that could alter the quality of the ABS inves
tors' investment, the investors are not subject to the vagaries of the origi
nator's business behavior, and their risk exposure is limited to the obvious
risks associated with the assets in the pool. 81
Finally, securitization, as a risk-contained method of financing, has
proven to be a useful strategy for firms which have filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code82 and who need to raise post
After the originator in bankruptcy structures its
petition funds. 83
securitization, it must file a motion with the bankruptcy court pursuant to

as such, is in the best position to evaluate the risk of and absmb this fitst loss. See Rosenthal &
Ocampo. supra note 5, at 34.
76. Nicholas Millan!, The Management and Transfer ofCredit, Liquidity and Contingency Risks,
in THE GLOBAL AssEr BACKED SECilRITIES MARKET, supra note 5, at 127, 127 (defming event risks
as "the risk that the rating of the pany which has assumed the credit and liquidity risks may have its
own credit stams lowered, thereby leading to an overall reduction in the rating on the security").
77. See DUANE B. GRADDY Er AL., COMMERCIAL BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY256-59 (1985). In addition, asset qualicy risk can be addressed by segmenting the assets into
tranches with common risk characteristics and then marl<eting them to appropriate investots. Those
market participants willing to absorb, for example, a higher risk of default, late payment, or
prepayment can be offered a class of ABS with a higher yield than that offered by ABS with a lower
risk of default. See ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 5, at 13.
78. See ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra noteS, at 13.
79. See supra note 38.
80. See infra Pan IV.
81. Because many originatots tend to extend credit within cenain limited geographic areas,
economic downmrns or declines in such areas often impact originatots' fmancial health (as well as cash
flow) in significant ways. See Interview with Susan A. Papacostas, President of Nika Prescription
Services (Dec. 13, 1996) (on file with the Texas Law Review).
82. 11 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1129 (1994).
83. Since 1990, three depattment store companies in Chapter II (Federated Corporation, Caner
Hawley Hale, and P.A. Bergner & Co.) have securitized their credit can! receivables following their
filing for relief from creditots' claims under Chapter 11. See generally Glover, supra noteS, at 612
13.
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section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code84 requesting court approval of the
sale of the pool of assets to a special purpose corporation. 115 In addition,
the originator must file a motion under section 364 of the Bankruptcy
Code86 describing in detail the proposed transaction, and outlining any
and all expected benefits to the debtor and the estate. 87 Because the bank
ruptcy court confirms at the outset of the transaction the soundness and
efficacy of the transaction's structure, including the evaluation that the
transfer of assets from the originator to the SPC is a "true sale" 88 and that
the SPC and the originator will not be substantively consolidated,89 the
risk that a court will avoid the asset transfer on these bases is reduced. 90

E.

Funding at More Favorable Rates

Because securitizing originators can better manage event risks, securi
tization enables most firms to fund their operations at a lower effective
interest rate than through a secured borrowing arrangement. 91 RHS fund
ing can be very costly if a firm has a large quantity of debt on its books,
little or no financing track record or financial history, or lacks exposure to
a broad base of investors. 92
An originator can obtain this lower effective rate because the capital
markets do not consider its creditworthiness in pricing the rate of return for
the securitization of a firm's receivables. Rather, the quality of the
underlying assets determines the rate. 93 In cases where the originator's
credit rating is deficient, the capital markets (meaning the rating agencies)
may give a higher credit rating to the asset-backed securities issued by the
SPC than to the securities issued by the originator directly. 94 This
84. See 11 U.S.C. app. Rule 4001(a)(1)(1994)(requiring that a motion to condition the use, sale,
or lease of property shall be made in accordance with Rule 9014, which provides adverse parties with
notice and a hearing).
8S. See Glover, supra noteS, at 63S.
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (governing a re01ganizing company's right to obtain credit and grant
liens on assets).
87. See Glover, supra noteS, at 63S.
88. See infra section N(D)(1).
89. See infra section N(D)(2).
90. See generally discussion infra subpart N(D).
91. The traditional credit system in this counay is very expensive. It is estimated that the cost of
borrowing funds from a typical regulated financial instirution must include the cost of required reserves,
FDIC insurance, equity costs, loan loss reserves, and operating costs. See Lowell L. Bryan,
Conclusion: Asset SecuritizJJJk>n's Role in a Better Financial World, in THE ASsEr SECUR111ZATION
HANDBOOK, supra note S, at S49, SSO; Goldberg et at., supra note S, at SO (stating that asset
securitization has become popular because, among other reasons, it is less expensive lhan traditional
financing methods).
92. See Liebowitz, supra note 33, at 14 (discussing securitization as an attractive financing
alternative For below invesbnent grade companies).
·
93. See Overvitw ofStructured FliiQIIcings, CREDITREvlEW, Oct 2S, 1993, at 3, 3.
94. When a rating agency rates a traditional corporate security issuance, agency analysts evaluate
the financial condition and performance of a comn:::.nv. a.c:c:P:c;c;: ~e qual ito• '::f ~.~n3gement and its impact
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translates into a lower effective interest rate. Because the quality of the
asset-backed security issued depends upon the quality of the payment
stream of the underlying assets, it is the character and quality of the assets
that are under the rating agencies' intense scrutiny. 95
The diminished possibility that ABS investors will be affected by the
originator's potential for bankruptcy also improves the chance that the mar
kets will view an originator's ABS more favorably than its direct debt
issuances. Ideally, securitization transactions are structured so that the
securitized assets are "bankruptcy remote. " 96 In such a case, if the integ
rity of the transaction's structure is not compromised, 97 the assets trans
ferred by the originator to the SPC and used to back the asset-backed secu
rities will be deemed not to be part of the originator's bankruptcy estate
should the originator fold. 98 Thus, because of the severance of the credit
risk to the originator from the credit of the ABS and because of the
bankruptcy-remote nature of the transaction's structure, smaller, less
established, or more financially debilitated firms may be able to fund them
selves through a securitization on net terms similar to those offered to
larger, more established and financially sound firms. 99 This in tum may
enable certain firms to expand at a more rapid pace by utilizing a less
expensive source of funds for operations and long-term development.

E

Accounting-Related Advantages

Securitization further allows a firm to isolate a pool of financial assets
and match them with liabilities with similar maturities, tenor, and
price. 100 If a firm decides to take advantage of this financing option as
part of its overall financing strategy, it reduces the necessity to hedge its
funding obligations to eliminate a mismatch in asset and liability term and
interest rate. 101 This arrangement may prove to be advantageous to

upon the company's perfonnance, and offer an educated guess with respect to the company's future
prospects. See Legalities in Rating Mongage-Backed Securilies, CREDITREviEW, Oct. 25, 1993, at 9,
9-11.
95. See id. at 11-12.
96. Assets are "bankruptcy remote" when they are held by an entity that is unlikely to become
insolvent or subject to creditots' claims. See id. at 10; discussion infra notes 205-ll? and accompanying
text. Professor Matshall Tracht in his anicle suggesting a reconsideration of the enforceability of
bankroptcy waiver.;, referred to securitization as "[t]he most important development in limiting
bankroptcy access." Marshall E. Trncht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory,
Practice, and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 301, 310, 310-11 (1997).
97. This, however, is a very big "if. • For a discussion of the possible equitable cliallenges to the
structure of securitization transactions, see infra subpatt N(D).
98. See discussion infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
99. For any firm with less than a double-A credit rnting, the interest savings by securitizing, as
compared with traditional conunerciallending, may be significant. See Bryan, supra note 91, at 550.
100. See Goldberg et al., supra note 5, at 49.
101. This means that for floating-rate obligations, once assets are securitized, the originator no
longer has to worry about a future asset/liability mismatch. See id.
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customers and other creditors because the credit risk of the securitized asset
pool is segregated from the rest of the firm's assets, thus decreasing the
risk of interest rate fluctuation and a resulting disruption in the firm's cash
flow. 102
A related advantage to securitization is its treatment under the account
ing rules as compared with other forms of financing. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ( GAAP), 103 established by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), are the body of rules applicable to
many securitizing firms. 104 Pursuant to the Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 77, 105 a transfer of assets in connec
tion with a structured finance transaction will be treated as a sale for
accounting purposes if the transfer is made without "recourse." 106 This
type of transfer is known as an off-balance sheet sale and offers a firm
enormous flexibility in raising capital, without risking a violation of

102. See id.
103. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) outlines !he conventions, rules, and
procedures used in accounting practice. See Robert W. Berliner, Audit Reports, in ACCOUNTANTS'
LIABILITY 1992: AUDlTING FOR LAWYERS 41, 44 ( PU Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 440, 1992). GAAP includes bolh broad general guidelines as well as detailed practices and
procedures. See id.
104. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is a standards institute recognized by !he
SEC and !he American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; it also works closely wilh !he Federal
Reserve Board. Its mission is to develop accounting standards for business, industry, and fmance.
Insured depository institutions such as national banks and savings associations are subject to more
restrictive regulatocy account principles (RAP). As a standards body, !he FASB has no enforcement
aulhority. Enforcement is in !he hands of !he SEC for nonbanking companies. The Federal Reserve
Board, !he Office of !he Comptroller of !he Currency, and !he Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) have lhe aulhority to enforce FASB pronouncements wilh respect to banks. See generally
DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS & HEtNRJCH SrEINMANN, OFF-BALANCE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 129-34
(1994).
105. See REPoRTING BY TRANSFERORS FOR TRANSFERS OF RECEIVABLES WITH RECOURSE,
Statement of Fmancial Accounting Standards No. 77 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1983).
106. The FASB defines recourse as:
The right of a transferee of receivables to receive payment from !he transferor of !hose
receivables for:
(a) failure of !he debtors to pay when due,
(b) !he effects of prepayments, or
(c) adjusnnents resulting from defects in lhe eligibility of !he transferred
receivables.
/d. § 12.
A transfer wilh recourse is a transfer in which a seller agrees 10 repurchase any of !he underlying
loans !hat go into default or olherwise agrees 10 compensate !he buyer for losses on defaulting loans.
A transfer wilhout recourse is one in which an originator surrenders control of !he future economic
benefits of !he assets. Because sales of receivables wilh recourse have many of !he same characteristics
as loans collateralized by receivables, SFAS No. 77 outlines !he circumstances under which a transfer
of receivables wilh recourse should be treated for accounting purposes as a loan, ralher !han a sale.
See Raymond T. Sloane, Jr. & Thomas A. Tranfaglia, Jr., Accounting for Asset-Backed Transactions,
in THE HANDBOOK OF Ass'IT-BACKED SECURmES, supra note 5, at 79, 85-87 (st.ting !hat SFAS No.
77 provides guidance on whelher 10 treat a particular transaction involving receivables as a sale or Joan,
and explaining !he lhree conditions listed in !he standard).
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covenants and restrictions potentially found in its other financing
documents. 107
The three elements required of an asset sale under SFAS No. 77 are
(1) the surrender of economic control and future benefit of the assets, 108
(2) strictly limited recourse by the SPC to the originator, 109 and (3) the
existence of recourse provisions to the originator that are subject to reason
able estimation. no SFAS No. 77 allows for off-balance-sheet treatment
of the sale of receivables if these specific criteria are met.m This bene
fits a firm by improving its financial ratios, allowing it to stay within the
ratios found in the firm's other loan document covenants, or to simply
enable it to channel scarce capital to its business segments that may be in
need.n2

N. Securitization Viewed from the Unsecured Creditor's Perspective
As outlined above, securitization offers clear economic and financial

benefits to originators, ABS investors, and other transaction participants.
Rational economic actors will engage in securitization transactions only if
they believe that the net benefits of this choice exceed the net benefits of
the next most favorable financing alternative. The current volume of ABS
issuances 113 suggests that the parties making the decision to securitize are
concluding that securitization's net benefits do indeed exceed the benefits
of the alternatives. There is, however, another relevant perspective from
which to evaluate the economic impact of securitization: that of the
I07. It should be noted that if the receivables are sold and the originator retains the servicing role,
the servicing fee must be within nonnaJ market range. If there is a variation from the nonnal range,
the sales price of the receivables must be adjusted to provide for a nonnal servicing fee for each
subsequent servicing period. See ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN MORTGAGE BANKING ACTIVITIES,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 65, § 2 (Fmancial Accounting Standards Bd. 1982).
This adjustment ensures that the transferor does not reduce the amount of loss or increase the gain
recorded in the reponing sale period thereby leaving the originator recourse through a back door
ammgement. See Sloane & Tranfaglia, supra note 106, ar 97.
108. If the transferor bas the option to repurchase the receivables at a later date, then she bas not
surrendered control. See Sloane & Tranfaglia, supra note 106, at 86.

109. The transferor may retain a reversionary interest in the receivables if lhe interest is minor or
relatively insignificant. See id.
I 10. This may be difficult if the transferor does not have sufficient experience with the type of
receivables at issue to be able to make a reasonable estimate of the bad debt loss. See id.
111. If the originator is a regulated financial institution subject to RAP, it is subject to the capital
adequacy standards, which were adopted by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and which
the federal bank regulators follow. See 2 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL AssETS, supra note 5,
§ 13.03 (discussing the adoption of risk-based capital guidelines for regulating financial institutions).
Securitization is a particularly attractive financing method to such institutions because once an originator
removes an asset pool and a corresponding financing from its balance sheet, it will not have to maintain
capital on its balance sheet against the related asset. See Rosenthal & Ocampo, supra note 5, at 90-95
(discussing the benefits of securitization).
112. See Sloane & Tranfaglia, supra note 106, at 87.
113. See supra note 33.
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securitizing firm's unsecured creditors. The position an unsecured creditor
finds itself in when its debtor has securitized some or all of its assets is
analogous to the subordinate position afforded an unsecured creditor when
its debtor has provided assets as security to another creditor. In both
cases, the debtor's assets are earmarked and removed from the pool of
assets available to unsecured creditors. In the event of a debtor's default
or insolvency, unsecured creditors have a subordinate interest in such pre
viously identified assets; in the absence of an avoidance of the transfer of
or lien on these assets, they become unavailable to satisfy the unsecured
creditors' claims. 114
The obvious parallel between the plight of unsecured creditors when
a debtor offers its assets as collateral for a loan and when the same debtor
securitizes such assets begs consideration of the issue of securitization's
efficiency. The ongoing debate concerning secured credit's efficiency,
refreshed by the current Article 9 revision process, 115 provides a useful
framework for the discussion and analysis of the economic efficiency of
securitization transactions. 116

114. For a secured creditor to have !he risht to enforce its claim of a priority interest in an identi
fied asset against thin! parties with claims on !he same asset, !he creditor must perfect its security
interest by filing a financing statement in !he appropriate state office. See U .C.C. § 9-304(12)(1994).
ln !he case of money and instruments, perfection can only be accomplished by possession. See id. ln
addition, § 9-102 requires !he filing of a notice in !he public reconls in connection with !he sale of
accounts (and chattel paper) in !he same way debtors file notices with respect to !he grant of collateral.
The putpOSe of !he filing requirement is to provide notice to !he public and to !he debtor's other
creditors of !he sta!lls of !he ttansferrcd assets taken as collateral or sold. If creditors perfect !heir
security interests, security agreements commonly provide !hat !he lender has a right to declare a default
if !here is an interruption in payment. This declaration will, in most cases, entitle !he lender, if she
has adequately secured and perfected her interest pursuant to !he provisions of Article 9, to priority
over all of !he debtor's unsecured creditors as well as priority over subsequentjudgment creditors and
secured parties with competing claimS to !he same collateral. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-502(1)
(1994); see also JAMES]. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 22-1 to
-14 (4th ed. 199S) (discussing !he creation, perfection, and enforcement of Article 9 interests).
11S. ln 1972, !he Official Text of Article 9 of !he UCC was revised and adopted by vir!Ually all
of !he American states. Prior to Article 9's sta!lltory scheme, various bodies of substantive law
governed pre.Code security devices. See Wli1TE & SUMMERS, supra note 114, at § 21-1.
116. The risks assumed by a potential acquirer of an orisinator parallel !he risks assumed by
unsecured creditors of a securitizing originator. A potential acquiring company will be primarily
focusing upon its tar&et's business value and !he offering price. An acquirer, however, may not be
fully aware of bow to evaluate a company with a securitized portfolio of assets. As such, any potential
adjustments to income !hat might occur if any of !he securitized assets loss or prepayment assumptions
rum out to be false are going to be of great concern. Thus, !he extent to which risk is retained by !he
originator and acquired by !he acquirer will be a fuodamenta! issue to !he acquiring company. The four
primary issues pertaining to retained risk include recourse risk, prepayment risk, interest rate risk, and
!he risk !hat !he servicing arrangements are inadequate. An acquirer will most lllcely request
indemnification from the originator against this type of furure harm. See generally Kathryn A. Cassidy,
Securiliunion Trade-Ojfs-How Deal Slructure Can Influence the Future Value of Your Company or
Portfolio, in THE GLOBAL A5SIIT BACKED SECURITIES MARKEr, supra note 5, at 227, 227 (identifying
six areas of risk in such acquisitions, and stressing the need to consider the impact of securitization
strucrure on furore flexibility and company valuation).
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Secured Credit's Efficiency and Equitable Justifications, as Applied to
the Securitization Model

One of the most frequently cited advantages to securitization is that it
provides a firm with financing at a less expensive effective interest rate
than the firm could obtain through a direct secured lending
arrangement. 117 As stated above, this lower effective financing rate can
be attributed, in large part, to securitization's prototypical bankruptcy
remote structure, in which the assets transferred are removed from the pur
view of the originator's trustee in bankruptcy. 118 Indeed, neither aca
demic commentators nor transaction participants have offered an apology
for the fact that the financial advantages gained by an originator from the
movement of these assets beyond the reach of its general creditors are
among the driving forces behind the proliferation of the number and types
of originators securitizing assets. 119
Once the bankruptcy risk is effectively eliminated from the transaction,
the sale of the assets can return a relatively high price to the originator.
This price is analogous to the lower interest rate charged by secured cred
itors who have identified and earmarked a secondary source of repayment
in the event of a debtor default (commonly known as collateral), as com
pared to the higher interest rate charged by WlSecured creditors who have
no such payment back-up arrangement. 120 In a secured lending context,
in the event of a debtor's liquidation, it is the secured creditors who have
priority of payment over the unsecured creditors, precisely because of the
presence of the earmarked collateral. 121
This priority arrangement forms the basis for one of the fundamental
premises of Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code; in the event of a debtor's
liquidation, secured lenders get paid from their collateral (or its equivalent
in value) before unsecured creditors. 122 Unsecured creditors must be

117. See supra subpart III(E).
118. See supra text accompanying note 205.
119. See ROSENTIIAL & OCAMPO, supra note 5, at 8-23 (summarizing the benefits of securitization
of credit). See generally 111E EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (ALI
ABA Course of Srudy, Dec. 12-14, 1996); Schwarcz, Structured FiJUmce, supra note 5, at 613-18; see
also Tracht, supra note 96, at 310-11.
120. The interest rate charged is a factor of the nonpayment risk. When a lender perfects a

security interest in collateral in cmmection with a loan. it has increased its chance of repayment, either
directly by the debtor, or from the value of the collateral. The equation P {probability) x L (loss
suffered from default) illustrates the concept. The loan loss value, L, will be offset by the chance, P,
that collateral will be used to satisfy the debt. See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy
Priorities: A Review of Cu"ent Theories, 10 J. LEGAL SI1JD. I, 8 (1981). See generally WEIR M.
BROWN, BANK LENDING TO BUSINESS BORROWERS: lNTERESr RATES AND U.S. MONIITARY POUCY
09~.

.

121. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994).
122. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 114, § 25-10, at 919-20.
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satisfied with a pro rata share of whatever is left over. 123
Notwithstanding the endurance of this accepted commercial practice,
whether secured creditors ought to continue to have priority over the
subordinated claims of general unsecured creditors has been and continues
to be a topic of dispute among academics and commercial
practitioners. 124 Indeed, the recent Article 9 revision process has
renewed the enthusiasm for this discussion and has resulted in placing the
question of secured creditor priority at the top of the revision committee's
discussion list. 125
The essence of this discussion is the question of whether secured credit
is efficient and whether secured claims' priority status in bankruptcy results
in an inequitable outcome. Implicit in this question is the issue of whether
secured creditors are realizing gains at the expense of unsecured creditors
in a way that challenges accepted principles of efficiency and equity.
In their seminal article written in 1979, Professors Thomas H. Jackson
and Anthony T. Kronman argued that the legal rules allowing creditors to
take security for loans are economically efficient. 126 They rest their con
clusion on two arguments. First, they argued that unsecured creditors are
compensated for their subordinated status by being paid an interest rate
premium. IZ1 Second, they contended that even in the absence of a legal
regime providing for secured credit, creditors would establish a parallel
priority scheme because of the market advantages inherently available for
riskier unsecured loans. 128
Professor Alan Schwartz challenged this conclusion and its underlying
assumptions in a 1981 article. 129 Professor Schwartz took issue with the
123. See id.
124. See generally Symposium on the Revision ofAnicle 9 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, 80
VA. L. REv. 1783 (1994); see aL<o.Memorandum from Professor Elizabeth Warren, Harvard Law
School, to the Council of the American Law Instimte (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with the Texas Law
Review) (slating that she had initiated her draft ofa proposed amendment to Anicle 9 which would "set
aside ••• assets for unsecured creditors" following "an extensive debate over the efforts of the current
Article 9 drafting committee to extend the reach of security interests to lock up all the property of a
debtor").
125. See Anicle 9 Reporter's Scatement of Policy Issues for the NCCUSL 1996 Annual Meeting
(June 17, 1996) (on file with the Texas Law Review). Some of the issues set forth in the scatement
include: (I) whether "the revised Anicle 9 [should) continue to facililate and promote the creation and
enforcement of security interests"; (2) whether "the revised Anicle 9 [should] retain its [current]
priority scheme under which perfected security interests are senior to the rights of lien creditors and
unperfected security interests are junior to those rights"; (3) whether "the revised Article 9 [should]
subordinate, in whole or in pan, perfected security interests to the rights of some or all classes of
unsecured creditors"; and (4) whether "the revised Article 9 [should) subordinate the rights of lien
creditors to unperfected security interests." Id.; see Lucian Acye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The
Uneasy Case for the Priority ofSecured Claims in Bankruptcy, lOS YALE L.J. 857 (1996).
·126. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Fmancing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1157 (1979).
127. See id. at 1148.
128. See id. at 1157.
129. See Schwartz, supranote•f10:
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conclusion of secured credit's efficiency130 and outlined the difficulties
with the "conventional efficiency story" offered to explain secured
debt. 131 He suggested that the savings gained by debtors borrowing from
some creditors on a secured basis are offset by the premiums demanded by
unsecured creditors for their heightened risk of noncollection. He further
questioned whether one can conclude that security is efficient without iden
tifying a reduction in social cost and explored the issue of whether the
aggregate benefits of security equal or exceed its aggregate costs. 132
Unable either to identify the reduced costs or to effectively quantify bene
fits of a system of security, Schwartz concluded that the efficiency of
secured debt was unproven. 133
Since the publication of Professor Schwartz's article, many academics
have addressed the efficiency of secured transactions. Some have con
cluded that secured credit's efficiency is unproven, or at least
problematic, 134 and others have sought to substantiate their contention of
efficiency by cataloging a roster of justifications for its continued
existence. 135 The justifications offered for the persistence of secured

130. See id. at 7. Professor Schwartz's position is essentially a statement of the Miller-Modigliani
irrelevance theorem~ which provides that, under ideal conditions, a firm should be indifferent to its
capital structure; the level of invesbnent made by a f1m1 is unaffected by the type of security used to
finance the invesbnent. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller. The Cost ofCopital, Corporation
Finance and The Theory ofInvestment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261. 288-93 (1958). Professor Schwanz
demonstrated that the Miller-Modigliani theory ofindifference can be applied to a f1m1's mix of secured
and unsecured debt. See Schwartz, supra note 120, at 7-8.
131. Professor Schwanz observed three fundamental difficulties with the efficiency explanations
for the existence of secured debt: (1) the explanations fail to accurately predict the effects of the
absence or presence of security (for example. the effects security has on firm debt-monitoring. the type
of signal security sends, or the benefits to a firm of interest rates that are staggered over time); (2) the
explanations fail to explain why security is used by debtors. rather than alternatives; and (3) the
explanations do not prove that secured debt's social gains exceed its social costs. See Schwanz. supra
note 120. at 7-29.
132. This is a slightly different formulation than the defmition of efficiency known as "Pareto
efficiency." so named after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto. A situation is said to be Pareto
efficient or Pareto optimal if there is no change from that situation which can make someone better off
without making someone else worse off. See, e.g•• A. MITCHELL POUNSKY. AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 n.4 (1983).
133. See Schwartz. supra note 120. at 37 ("[N]o plausible showing that secured debt actually
increases welfare exists.").
134. See Bebchuk & Fried. supra note 125. at 857.
135. See Barry E. Adler. An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority PuWe. 22 J.
LEGAL STuD. 73 (1993) (contending that the priority secured credit enjoys over unsecured credit is
beneficial because it encourages more scrutiny by unsecured creditors); Richard L. Barnes. The
Efficiency Justifications for Secured Transactions: Foxes with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stllff, 42 KAN.
L. REV. 13, 15-16 (1993) (describing attempts by legal scholars to provide economic justifications for
secured credit); James W. Bowers. Whither What Hils the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory
~the Elementary Economics ofLoss Distribution. 26 GA. L. REV. 2?, 36-37 (1991) (arguing that
secured and unsecured credit options give creditors choices in demonstrating their preferences. thus
increasing the incentive to contract); F.H. Buckley. The Bankruptcy Priority PuWe, 72 VA. L. REV.
1393, 1395-96 (1986) (noting that security grants reduce both screening costs and incentive costs of
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credit include the potential for secured credit to (1) protect against asset
wasting or dissipation, 136 (2) signal that a debtor with secured credit is
a good credit risk, 137 (3) reduce the total costs of monitoring the debtor's
business behavior, 138 and (4) generally increase the availability of
credit. 139
The claim of securitization's efficiency is less substantiated than the
same claim with respect to secured credit. Although many of the same jus
tifications for secured credit's continued existence have been used to justify
and explain the increasing number of securitization transactions, these jus
tifications do not fully or accurately explain securitization's place in the
credit market} 40

B.

Challenges to the Efficiency of Securitization
1. Securitization's FJjiciency Is Unproven.-On its face, securitization

appears to be a creative, albeit complex, way of reducing a firm's effective
interest rate while offering it positive strategic advantages. In a hypo
thetical vacuum where the only parties' interests to be considered are those
of the originator and the ABS investors, the fact that an increasing number
of firms are securitizing assets to meet the market's "insatiable"
demand 141 for ABS suggests that the economic benefits exceed the costs
for these parties. This conclusion assumes that parties are acting

crediiOrs, in tum increasing value 10 the firm); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial
and Corporate S.nings, 92 YALE LJ. 49, 68·72 (1982) (arsuing that secured credi10rs may conlribute
10 reduce the freerider problem among shareholders, helping lower a firm's capital cosJs); Randal C.
Picker, S.curiry Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 645, 646 (1992)
(arguing that "secured credit is a sensible response to the problem of crediiOr misbehavior"); Alan
Schwanz, 1he Continuing Puzzle ofSecured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1984) (arguing that such
efficiencies can not be known with assurance); Robert E. Scott, A Relational 1heory of Secured
F'mancing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 970 (1986) (contending that a debtor-creditor relational model for

understanding secured transactions enhances the argument that such mechanisms can increase finn
value); Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067,
1073-83 (1989) (describing attempiS to justi!Y the efficiency of secured credit); George G. Triantis,
Secured Debt Und.r Conditions of/mpeifect InformaJion, 21 J. LEGAL STuD. 225 (1992) (noting the
need to examine information imperfections in debt markeiS in order to evaluate various efficiency
theories); James J. White, E;//icieney JuslijicalionsfOr Personal Property Security, 37 V AND. L. REv.
473 (1984) (outlining the general efficiency justifications, and challenging the assumptions regarding
differential risk aversion as an efficiency justification). See generally, Symposium, supra note 124.
136. See White, supra note 135, at 487-89.
137. See id. at 476-77.
138. See Jackson & Kmnman, supra note 126, at 1149-61 (analyzing the impact of monitoring
allocation among parties and outlining fac10rs which influence crediiOrs' desire and ability to monitor);
Levmore, supra note 135, at55-57 (arsuing that a secured crediiOr's motivation 10 monitor would solve
the freerider problem) .
. 139. See Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economi_c I;fficieney ofCommercial
Law in a Vacuum ofFact, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 929, 941-46 (1985).
140. s-. generally supra note 5.
141. See generally supra note 33.
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with sufficient rationality to accurately assess the costs and benefits
to them.
When securitization's third-party distributional effects are taken into
account, a firm may be securitizing assets even when the transaction results
in economic inefficiencies. When firm managers pursue investments and
financing strategies that increase expected creditor losses more than such
strategies increase expected shareholder return, such investments are
inefficient. 142 The dissonance between what decisions are good for the
firm, versus what is good for the firm's creditors, results in an inefficient
enrichment of shareholders at the expense of creditors. 143
To illustrate, suppose a firm has $100 in assets and $100 in liabilities.
Upon liquidation, the firm's creditors would get paid in full and its share
holders would be left with nothing. The firm knows of an investment
opportunity that will cost $100 and will return $200 if successful, but zero
if unsuccessful. There is a one-in-two chance of success or failure.
Should the firm make this investment?
From the creditors'
perspective, it should not. If the investment succeeds, the firm creditors
will get no more than $100, but if the investment does not succeed, the
creditors will be left with nothing. However, from the standpoint of the
firm (that is, its shareholders), it should make the investment. If the
investment loses, it is the creditors that bear the loss. Because the firm is
insolvent anyway, the shareholders lose nothing if the firm loses its
investment, but if the investment pays off, it is they, not the creditors, who
reap the benefit. 144
Furthermore, an originator's ability to divert value from its unsecured
creditors to its ABS investors results in costs to unsecured creditors who
fail to adjust to and adapt their behaviors to their heightened post
securitization risk. To the extent a creditor can understand and predict the
effect securitization will have on its chance of repayment, both in the
absence of and in bankruptcy, it can negotiate terms to reflect this risk. If
the originator did not bargain with its unsecured creditors prior to the
securitization, either because the creditors are involuntary or otherwise

142. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 125, at 873.
143. See George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory ofSecured Debt and Creditor Priorities,
80 VA. L. REv. 2155, 2155 (1994) ("The premise of agency theozy is that self-interested managers
make the decisions ofa corporation, and these decisions may enrich the managers or their shareholders
at the expense of the firm's creditors.").
144. Another example makes the same point, but more dramatically. A firm makes an invesnnent
of $100 at a Las Vegas gaming table, and the $100 is put on a number that has a one-in-a-hundred
chance of coming up. This invesnnent also has an expected value of $100 (a I% chance of making
$10,000 and a 99% percent chance of making nothing). So what would the debtor and creditors say
about this "invesnnent proposal"? The rational debtor-shareholder-originator's response should be
identical to the creditors. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 372-74 (2d ed. !990).
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nonadjusting, 145 a transfer of value from the creditor to the firm's share
holders will result. As is the case with secured credit, it is primarily these
nonadjusting creditors that are subject to the greatest economic costs when
a firm securitizes. Securitization may result in a transfer of value from
these nonadjusting creditors, and to the extent there is no corresponding
adjustment in the cost of unsecured credit, the shareholders of the securitiz
ing firm have captured such value.
Even if one can assume perfect information and consent on the part of
unsecured creditors and other third parties with claims against securitizing
originators, 146 the conclusion that securitization is an efficient way for a
firm to finance its operations and thus ought to be encouraged remains
unproven.

2.

Securitimtion's Justijications.-In the absence of bankruptcy,

secured credit results in a number of benefits to a debtor and its other cred
itors that support and enhance the efficient outcome of the secured credit
transaction. These benefits relate to a secured party's ability to control
what has been referred to as "debtor misbehavior" and have been used to
justify secured credit's prominent position in our commercial economy.
These justifications include the potential for secured credit resulting in: (1)
protection against asset wasting or dissipation,l 47 (2) the provision of a
signal that a debtor with secured credit is a good credit risk, 148 (3) a
reduction in the total costs of monitoring the debtor's business
behavior,l 49 and (4) a general increase in the availability of credit}50
These controls on a debtor's post-financing behavior, however, are not
available to a firm's unsecured creditors when the firm engages in a
securitization.

a. Securitization prevents a debtor from wasting assets.-When
an asset transfer is characterized as a transfer of collateral for a loan (and
thus a transfer made in connection with a secured financing), the originator

145. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 125, at 869-70. Nonadjusting creditors include ton
claimants; government tax and regulatol}' agencies; creditors with claims so small it is not prnctical to
seek infonnation about the debtor on ao ongoing basis or adjust !coding terms accordingly; and
unsecured creditors who extend credit on fixed terms. foreclosing the opponunity for adjustments in
the future. See id. at 870. Such nonadjusting creditors are also known as involuntuy and voluntacy
uninformed creditors. For a discussion of implied consent by these creditors, see infra subpan N(C).
146. For a discussion regarding the assumption of perfect information and consent, see infra
subpan N(C).
147. S<e White, supra note 135, at 487-89.
148. Seeid. at 476-77.
149. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 126, at 1149-61; Levmore, supra note 135, at SS-57.
ISO. Su Kripke, supra note 139, at 941 (arguing that in most ttansactions involving secured
credit, the credit. could not have been obtained without grnnting security).
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with title to the assets pledges them to a lender as collateral, but retains an
ownership interest in them. 151 In such a case, the debtor who enjoys the
secured credit extended by its lender no longer has the freedom to do what
it wants with its encumbered assets, notwithstanding its retention of title to
them. 152 The debtor is commonly precluded by agreement from giving
away, selling, or wasting these assets. 153
In contrast, the objective of a securitizing originator is to remove,
through a sale, cenain assets of the originator from its ownership and
control. Once removed, neither contract nor statute requires the originator
to preserve these assets or their value, and upon their sale, the securitized
assets become the property of the purchaser. The originator is not required
or motivated to preserve the consideration received from the asset sale; as
stated above, it is free to spend this cash any way it chooses-or to simply
squander it. 154
In addition, asset purchasers, in contrast to lenders, have no interest
in contractually prohibiting an originator from inefficient
decisionmaking-which may include both imprudent business decisions and
the wasting of non-securitized assets. Lenders may, and indeed often do,
outline a set of behaviors foreclosed to the debtor because of their potential
for adverse distributional consequences. These behaviors may include
restrictions against encumbrances on the transfer of certain assets, restric
tions on certain investment activity, restrictions on the creation of certain
security interests, and even a prohibition against a change in the debtor's
business policies, practices, or type of industry. 155 These restrictions
serve as a check on a borrower's post-credit extension behavior and protect
the interests of the borrower's unsecured creditors. Post-securitization,
there is no party with sufficient interest in the originator to control any
aspect of its ongoing behavior.
Moreover, a further objective of a securitizing originator is to remove
its securitized assets from its potential bankruptcy estate. Indeed, that is
what a bankruptcy-remote transactional structure is designed to do-transfer

151. Iflhe bonoweruses its assets as collateral for a loan, lhe lender may make a single advance
against a pool of current and after-acquired accounts or may extend a line of credit to lhe bonower up
to a specified amount. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 114, at 756 (introducing lhe
concept of attachment by a creditor).
152. Constraints wilh respect to collateral are generally imposed upon lhe debtor by contract. See
LoPUCK! & WARREN, supra note 62, at 255-56 (discussing lhe types of contracrual default provisions
included in security agreements).
153. Exceptions to lhis rule include lhc ability 10 substiblte collateral and lhe ability 10 take a
securit;y interest in assets lhat regularly rum over in lhe ordinary course of lhe debiOr's business, such
as inven10ry and accounts. See LoPUCK! & WARREN, supra note 62, at 195-99 (discussing securit;y
interests tied to debiOr assets which have changing components but stability of identit;y and collateral
value).
·
154. See supra section IV(B}(1).
155. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 125, at 879 (discussing lhe ways lhat covenants can be used

to conlrOI inefficient behav;nY''
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the assets to an entity that is not required to participate in the debtor's
bankruptcy. The fundamental difference in a bankruptcy context between
a secured financing and a securitization is that a secured creditor, by
statute, is a necessary party to the debtor's bankruptcy, 156 whereas securi
tization participants (meaning the SPC as asset transferee and the ABS
investors) have as their goal the establishment of a remote position from
the bankrupt originator. 157 In such a case, if the asset transfer is upheld
by the court, the asset transferee (the SPC) is not subject to the reach of
the automatic stay, and the payment source of the ABS (the securitized
assets) is effectively separated from the bankruptcy estate ofthe originator. 158

156. Bankruptcy constrains both debtors and creditors from altering their rights in the collaternl.
All property in which the debtor has an interest at the time of the bankruptcy fding is no longer deemed
to be the debtor's but becomes pan of the estate that is created automatically upon the debtor's bank
ruptcy fding. This includes the debtor's interest in property encumbered by a security interest as well
as unencumbered property. The trustee is charged with the responsibility of presetving and protecting
the value of the debtor's finite and often limited estate for the benefit of the debtor's unsecured
creditors. Upon bankruptcy fding, secured creditors become necessaty parties to their debtor's
bankruptcy. The automatic stay(§ 362 of the Bankruptcy Code) comes into effect immediately upon
the filing for bankruptcy and precludes all creditors, including secured creditors, from demanding pay
ment from the debtor and from taking possession of, selling, leasing, or otherwise disposing of col
lateral until the bankruptcy process is complete and the debtor is discharged. Unless the stay is lifted,
a secured party is constrained from simply exiting the debtor's bankruptcy without being forced to par
ticipate fully in the process. Participation means that, in many instances, a secured creditor must wait
out the duration of the bankruptcy process before it can claim its collateral. The trustee engages in an
independent examination of the claim ofthe creditor's secured status. Following such examination. the
trustee may discover that the ostensible secured party's "priority lien" in the collateral was not
adequately created or perfected. Even if properly perfected, the trustee may fmd that this collateral has
increased or decreased in value, or is subject to the conflicting claims of another putpOned secured
creditor. If the creation or perfection of the security interest is flawed or if it is determined that a
competing claimant to that particular collaternl has priority, the creditor is no longer deemed to be
adequately secured. The identified collaternl is then either "earmarked" for the other party with
priority security or it is returned to the estate without a priority claim on it and becomes available for
pro rata distnbution to the debtor's general unsecured creditors. During the period of lime that a
secured creditor has a claim on assets, whether or not it is ultimately determined to be properly
perfected, the debtor is prohibited from wasting such assets. See II U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(l)-(2), 363
(1994); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY, supra note 6, § 3-1 to -3, -II to -13.
157. The asset purchaser, unlike the secured creditor, is not a "party in interest" in the securitizing
debtor's bankruptcy estate. Section 1109(b} of the Bankruptcy Code defines "party in interest" to
include "the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' comminee, an equity security holders' committee, a
creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee." II U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1994); see In re
Manin Paint Stores, 199 B.R. 258,264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that "party in interest" for
purposes of lifting an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994) includes only the debtor and its
creditors (citing In re Comcoach Cotp., 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that, for standing
putpOses, "party in interest" is resetved to one that is able to seek legal redress under applicable
substantive law)}}, aff'd sub nom. Southern Blvd., Inc. v. Manin Paint Stores (In re Manin Paint
Stores), 2rr7 B.R. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
158. This is not to say that assets sold in a securitization or any other context may never be
returned to the bankruptcy estate of the originator. The Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee powers that
allow it, under cenain defined cin:umstances, to bring back into the debtor's estate property that may
have been previously transferred to a third party that is outside the control and possession of the debtor.
Section. 544 of the Bankruptcy Code confers on the trustee all the rights. under Slate law of a
hypothetical creditor with a liollnOillall<lhe-prope!ljl.o£.tleedebtm2s ,s.,.-;1-U:JtS.C. § 544. The
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b. Securitization provides a signal to third parties with respect
to the credit risk ofthe originator.-Another justification commonly offered
for secured debt is that it provides a signal to unsecured creditors of deb
tor's prospects. 159 According to this "signaling" explanation, secured
credit allows unsecured creditors to extend credit at a reduced interest rate
because such debtor is a better risk than other debtors without secured
credit. 160

avoidance of a transfer under § 544(a) does not happen automatically upon the request of a party in
interest or upon a motion to confitm a plan uoder Chapter II, but must be the subject of an advetsary
proceeding. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7087. The Advisory Committee Notes to Part VII of the
Bankruptcy Rules state that "[p]roceedings to which the rules in Part VII apply directly include those
brought to avoid transfers by the debtor under§§ 544,545, 547, 548 and 549 of the Code." FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7001 advisory committee note. Transferees must be served with a complaint, a summons,
and a notice of trial, and the burden is shifted to the trustee to defeat the prima facie evidence presented
by the transferee that the transfer should not be avoided. II U.S.C. §§ 362(g), 547(g); 11 U.S.C.
app. Rule 7004. Thus, a party in interest must affirmatively challenge the transferee's claim of interest
in the identified assets. If at the time the trustee exercises its avoiding powers under § 544(a) the assets
have been transferred to a third party (such as an SPC), § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee
the power to recover the assets for the benefit of the estate. Section 550 reads:
(a)
Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided

under section 544 . . . the trustee may recover? for the benefit of the estate? the
property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of the property, from
(1)
the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such

transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
11 u.s.c. § 550.
Once the assets are recovered, they come back into the fold of the estate and are available for
pro rata distribution to the debtor's unsecured creditors. The relevant state law is UCC § 9-301(1)(b),
which provides:
(1)
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the rights of ...
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is
perfected.
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1994). This blending of state and federal bankruptcy law allows the trustee to
take priority over any and all unperfected security interests. Thus, once a bankruptcy petition is med,
the failure of a creditor or transferee to comply with the relevant requirements of Article 9 gives the
trustee priority in the property subject to the interests of the creditor-transferee. See 11 U.S.C. § 544.
The discussion in Part V of this Article examines the courts' confusion with respect to this issue.
As such, the transferee of assets who has failed to perfect or maintain its security interest under
the tertns of Article 9 competes with the trustee for a priority position with respect to the particular
assets at issue. This means that if the transferee of securitized accounts does not perfect the transfer
in accordance with the rule set forth in UCC § 9-102 by an appropriate ming in compliance with the
provisions of UCC § 9-203, its interest may be voided by the trustee. Section 9-102, outlining the
transactions to which Article 9 applies, states that the provisions of Article 9 apply to any sale of
accounts or chattel paper. See U.C.C. §§ 9-102, 9-203; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 114, § 21-1
to -3.
159. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 126, at 1161, 1149-61 (arguing that "it is to the benefit
ofall concerned that monitoring burdens be shifted to those creditors who are able to bear them at least
cost"); see also White, supra note 135, at 476-77 (stating that such justification conflicts with the
common understanding of security that the greater the risk; the greater the need for security).
160. But see Schwartz, supra note 120, at 17,14-21 (challengingtheconclusionthatsecured credit
sends a signal that the borrower is a good risk because debtors who are good credit risks need not give
collateral, and thus security is. at ®st ~_~~bien· ....,.~ .. c:oiO'nal).
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Whatever the merits of this explanation for secured credit, 161 the
signal broadcasted when an entity securitizes its assets should not be read
the same way as the secured credit signal. As stated previously, the
current market of originators is largely comprised of firms with low credit
ratings, those with little or no borrowing track records, and entities with
a lack of exposure to a diversity of investors. 162 Indeed, it is because of
these qualities that many of the newest securitization market originators
have turned to structured finance. If the market demands (and rating agen
cies and investors do) that the originators securitize only their highest qual
ity assets, then the prevailing signal to unsecured creditors is not that the
originator is a good risk-and therefore unsecured creditors should charge
a discounted interest rate-but that the originator's highest quality assets
have been sold-with only "junk" remaining from which the unsecured
creditors can satisfy their claims.
Moreover, unsecured creditors may not have access to sufficient infor
mation to read the broadcasted signal; the adequacy of disclosure of the
quality of securitized assets has been called into question in recent
years. 163 In response to the market's concerns, the SEC is considering
revising its disclosure standards for certain ABS issuances. 164 The secur
itization signal is a difficult one to read and, as such, the interest rates
charged by the unsecured creditors are not an accurate reflection of the
risks being borne.

c. Securiti<Ption reduces monitoring costs to creditor.r.-Theorists
posit two distinct models of monitoring by secured creditors: (I) secured
creditors monitor the assets encumbered by the security interest, or (2) they
monitor the debtor's entire business to determine the probability of
default. 165 Monitoring may serve either as a private good, having no
161. See While. supra note 135. at477. 476-77 (challenging the signaling explanation on the basis
that. because security "impedes the debtor's possibility for subsequent bonowing. minimizes its
maneuvering room on the verge of default. and gives greater power to the creditor upon default." the
grant of security is a greater burden to a high risk debtor than it is to a low risk one).
162. See supra Part II.
163. The Public Securities Association ( PSA). a Wall Street ttade group. suggested in a letter to
the SEC that the existing disclosure rules "stand in the way of disseminating useful information to
investors." PSA Urges Disclosure Overhaul. COM. MORTGAGE ALERT, Nov. ll. 1996. at 7, 7,
available in 1996 WL 7983320. Specifically. the PSA is concerned that ABS investors should have
at least 48 hours before the securities are sold to review infOimation with respect to the underlying
assets. A further issue raised by the PSA is that "many new issuers have entered the securitization
market with little or no operating histocy ," and as such. this fact ought to be disclosed. Aaron Elstein.
SEC Considers Increasing Disclosure on Asset-Backeds. AM. BANKER. Oct. 10. 1996. at 20.
164. See Elstein. supra note 163.
165. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 126, at ll~1 (positing that the burdens of monitoring
debtors should be shifted to those creditors who are able to bear them at the least cost); Levmore, supra
note 135. at 53 (arguing that large commercial lenders are in a better position to police a debtor for
risky behavior).
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direct effect upon the firm's other creditors, or it may result in a public
good, where the other creditors of the debtor (and often the unsecured
creditors) reap the benefit of the monitor's diligence. 166 Monitoring may
have positive consequences for creditors: the monitor takes on the role of
a "joint venturer" of the debtor, attuning its radar to the issue of creditor
repayment. 167 Alternatively, monitoring may inflict negative externalities
on interested third parties. For example, a creditor's monitoring of a
debtor may allow the creditor to detect an imminent default more quickly
and thereby give that creditor the advance information and opportunity to
seize the debtor's assets first. 168
If purchasers of securitized assets monitor at all, they do so in the
form of short-term private monitoring. The asset purchaser's concern in
the course of its pre-securitization diligence is with the quality of the assets
sold and the corresponding credit enhancement. Beyond this initial
diligence, there is no reason for ongoing monitoring of the originator's
business behavior. 169
In contrast, one of the primary concerns of unsecured creditors is the
debtor's post-credit-extension behavior. They want to ensure that the
debtor refrains from engaging in any behavior riskier than the behavior
engaged in when their initial bargain was struck. 170 If the securitized
assets are moved from the originator's purview to a bankruptcy-remote
entity, ultimate purchasers of the ABS have no continuing incentive to
monitor the debtor for risky behavior. As a result, the originator's unse
cured creditors are left with one of two alternatives: (1) to maintain their
lending relationship with the debtor in the absence of monitoring, or (2) to
monitor the debtor themselves. 171
A debtor-creditor relationship in the absence of monitoring is a risky
one; the less information available to the creditor, the higher the risk that
166. See Levmore, supra note 135, at 53·54.
167. See id. at 54-55 (stating that credit agencies that collect and report information with respect
to a debtor's lending histoty are common in the world of commercial fmance). These credit agencies,
however, do not report whether and to what extent a fmn bas securitized a portion of its assets.
168. See Picker, supra note 135, at 657.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99 (discussing the diminished possibility that the
purchaser of securitized assets will be involved in the originator's bankruptcy).
170. Debtors and creditors have different motivations following the extension ofcredit. Post credit
extension, a creditor is interested in decreasing the risk of the loan, thereby increasing its effective
interest rate. The debtor, by conttast, has the incentive to engage in riskier behavior, thus retroactively
decreasing the effective interest rate charged. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 144, at 373. This
incentive has been referred to as the phenomenon of "the threat of debtor misbehavior. • Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 126, at 1150, 1149-50; see also Schwanz, supra note 120, at 9-10 (discussing
debtor pursuit of higher-risk projects after making loans, thereby reducing retroactively the loans'
effective interest rates).
171. The degree to which unsecured creditors will ·monitor the debtor depends upon their
perception of the "risk that the debtor will misbehave." Jackson & Kronman, supra note 126, at 1151,
1150-51.
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the creditor will be unable to preempt a catastrophic event that leads to
default. 172 Furthermore, monitoring by an unsecured creditor is expen
sive and should result in a higher interest rate charged for the credit;
correspondingly, a relationship in the absence of monitoring should require
higher interest costs. 173 Because, however, unsecured creditors of securi
tizing firms are not operating in a world of perfect information, 174 they
may not lmow or understand the extent to which the debtor is being mon
itored and, as such, they may find themselves in either a position of bear
ing higher risk or higher expenses than if their debtor used its assets as
collateral for a secured loan.

d. Securitization results in a general increase in the availability
of credit (and is this a good thing?).-Securitization, with its focus on the
quality of the assets to be securitized and not the general credit quality of
the originator, may, in some circumstances, make credit more available to
an increasing number and variety of entities. 175 Securitization may be the
only way for a particular originator to raise money. As a result, securitiz
ation may benefit a securitizing entity's unsecured creditors by increasing
the overall liquidity of the borrowing party. 176 If securitization results
in the improvement of the financial health of the originator and thus signals
the continuation of the originator, securitization should give comfort to
those unsecured creditors who rely on the cash flow of their debtor's
business-the so-called "cash-flow surfers. " 177 Once the originator's
assets are sold (securitized), the originator is "awash with cash." 178
Arguably, the unsecured then have a fur better chance of getting paid. 179
This justification, however, rests upon a fundamental assumption: that
the cash that results from the liquidated assets is used to pay unsecured

172. See id. at 1150.
173. See id. at 1149-50.
174. Su supra section ffi(B)(3).
175. Su GeoQ!e J. Bentson, 1he Future ofAssetSea.ritization: 1he Benefits and Costs ofBreoking
up the Bank, in THE GLOBAL AssEr BACKED SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 5, at 3, 4-6.
176. See supra subpart ffi(B).
177. This term originated in Professor Lynn M. LoPucki's article, 1he Unsecured Creditor's
Bargain. In this article, Professor LoPucki describes two types ofunsccured lending: (I) "asset-based"
unsecured lending, and (2) "cash-flow surfing. • Lynn M. LoPucki, 1he Unsecured Credilor's
Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1891 (1994). Asset-based unsecured lending is "functionally
indistinguishable from secured lending, • in that unsecured creditors rely upon the unencumbered assets
of the borrower for their rccovezy in the event of liquidation. Id. at 1924, 1924-31. In contrast,
unsecured creditors arc cash-flow surfers when they rely upon the debtor's cash flow for repayment.
See id. at 1931-47.
178. See Paul M. Shupack, 1he Politics of Article 9: On Boundaries and Dtjinitions: A
Commentary on Dean Baird, 80 VA. L. REv. 2273, 2298 (1994).
179. q: LoPucki, supra note 177, at 1938 (explaining that unsecured creditors expect to be paid
from the debtor's bank account).
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creditors. Although the originator may choose to channel the cash result
ing from this increase in liquidity to repay unsecured creditors, it may
instead spend the cash on inventory that fails to tum over, or on projects
that do not succeed or do not increase the firm's profitability. What an
originator chooses to do with an increase in its liquidity is determinative
of whether such an increase is a benefit or a detriment to its unsecured
creditors. Because investors have no incentive to monitor an originator
once the asset transfer is complete, there are even fewer controls on a
firm's post-securitization behavior than there are on a firm's post-secured
credit behavior. 180
This justification for securitization raises the question of whether the
common welfare is improved by the enhancement of a firm's ability to
raise cash in the public markets, even though that firm has an unproven
credit performance or low credit rating. Arguably, firms that have been
unable to establish a borrowing track record based upon the traditional
credit profile have one or more indicia that flag them as a credit risk.
Firms that are a high credit risk are significantly more likely to end up in
bankruptcy. 181 If securitization enables these high-risk firms to transfer
their highest quality assets to a third party and provides no corresponding
controls on the consideration for this transfer, upon bankruptcy, the
unsecured creditors are left with a smaller residual pool of assets to
share. 182
Furthermore, as a greater number of financially marginal parties enter
the securitization market, an increasing number of poorly structured trans
actions occur because of haste, volume, or simple ineptitude}83 To the
extent there is a heightened risk factor for the unsecured creditors of
originators with "well structured" securitization transactions, there is an
even greater risk for an unsecured creditor of an originator with a· struc
tured financing destined to collapse.
The high volume of ABS issuances in recent years has led at least one
commentator to observe that investors have been so eager to invest in them
that they have not diligently required that the assets or the company behind
them "prove their reliability." 184 If the securitized assets are not of high

180. See supra subsection fV(B)(2)(c) for a discussion of originator monitoring.
181. See TEREsA A. SUWVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND
CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 282-92 (1989) (descn"bing the Joan losses that commercial lenders
suffer when they extend credit to small businesses).
182. The decline in consumer credit qualii;Y has inc,.,ased the risk ofpayment delinquencies. The
"new generation of assers ""' piggybacking on the reputation of traditional asset-backed securities as
safe inveslmenrs, but many of them have little or no track "'cord. • Woolley, supra note 9, at 64.
183. See Elstein, supra note 33 ("Sam Tillinghast, managing diRCtor of SuDAmerica Corporate
Finance •.• said •.. that as mo"' parlies seek to enter the securitization market, they ""' increasingly
failing to structure deals properly.").
184. /d.
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quality or if they do not have sufficient credit enhancement or if the deal
is structured so that the originator is to absorb the first loss up to a speci
fied level, I&S the originator's remaining assets will be further drained,
leaving even fewer assets in its residual pool.

C.

Consent as an Implicit Assumption

The implicit assumption supporting each of these justifications for
secured credit, as well as for the proliferation of securitization transactions,
is that unsecured creditors consented to their status. This implied consent
suggests that unsecured creditors (1) have agreed to whatever consequences
the law attaches to their credit extension, and (2) have contracted with per
fect information. 186
This "bargain model" of secured credit was originally articulated by
Professor Thomas Jackson. 187 His theory "view[s] bankruptcy as a
system designed to mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to
form among themselves were they able to negotiate such an agreement
from an ex ante position." 188 The bargain model is based on the idea
that the pre-bankruptcy position of creditors should be altered in bank
ruptcy only when such an alteration maximizes the net repayment of assets
as a collective. 189 Th the extent that the failure of a debtor's business is
anticipated by the creditors' pre-bankruptcy bargain, allowances and
adjustments were made at the time of the bargain. 190 It is the job of the
bankruptcy laws to provide the omitted terms of the bargain for those
parties who had no opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy
process-the unsecured creditors. 191

185. See Rosenthal & Ocampo, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that a successful securitization lowers
the cost of lending by reducing a portion of the needed equity capital and funding yield premiums).
186. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an /mpeifect World, 92 MICH.
L. REv. 336 (1993) (outlining and comprehensively analyzing various theories of business bankruptcy
policy objectives).
187. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain,
91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982). The "bargain model" is a shift from the conveyance model of secured
credit which is a property based theozy. The conveyance model views security as a grant of property
that leaves the debtor with the use and ownership of the collateral, but without the ability to commit
the property to unsecured creditors. See Steve Knippenberg, The Polilics ofArticle 9: The Unsecured
Creditor's Bargain: An Essay in Reply, Reprisal, or Support?, 80 VA. L. REv. 1967, 1968 (1994).
188. See Jackson, supra note 187, at 860.
189. See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature ofBankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 15 VA. L. REv. ISS, 155-56 (1989) ("[P]rebankruptcy
entitlements should be impaired in bankruptcy only when necessazy to maximize net asset disttibutions
to the creditors as a group ••.• ").
190. See id. at 160-61 (explaining that creditors consider the risk of insolvency, both when
deciding whether to take a security interest and when deciding the terms of the security interest).
191. Cf. id. at !58 (asserting that a "primary objective" of bankruptcy Jaw is to regulate "conflicts
among different groups having separate claims against a debtor's assets and income stream").
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Professor Lynn LoPucki forcefully challenged the assumption of con
sent in a recent article advocating the reordering of the priority scheme for
certain specified creditors. 192 In The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 193
LoPucki contends that secured debt facilitates the exploitation of involun
tary creditors, as well as voluntary but uninformed creditors, by imposing
on them a bargain to which they have provided no "meaningful
consent." 194 He argues that involuntary creditors, such as tort victims
and environmental claimholders, 195 have no opportunity to negotiate their
subordinate status and therefore cannot charge an interest rate that offsets
their heightened risk of non-payment in the event of a debtor's
insolvency. 196 He further argues that uninformed voluntary creditors
(those participants in the credit markets who miscalculate their likelihood
of recovery from an insolvent debtor) also fuil to negotiate an interest rate
premium. 197 LoPucki proposes that security interests be subordinated to
the claims of these voluntary uninformed and involuntary unsecured
creditors. 198
The bargain model, when used to explain an unsecured creditor's sub
ordinate position after its debtor securitizes its valuable assets, is likewise
based upon fulse assumptions. Neither involuntary nor voluntary unin
formed unsecured creditors have the information or the opportunity to
make ex ante adjustments in their bargain to reflect their actual risk. The
interest rate charged does not reflect the heightened risk they are subject
to because of the asset securitization.
Furthermore, although most voluntary uninformed unsecured creditors
are probably aware that their debtor has the option to incur secured debt,
they are less likely to be fumiliar enough with the structural intricacies of
securitization transactions to ask the right questions and understand the
implications of securitization. 199 Because of the complex nature of

192. See LoPucki, supra note 177.
193. ld.
194. See id. at 1890-9!.
195. Other involuntaiy creditors include insurance claimants; children and fanner spouses; airline
ticket holders; and victims of securities and other fiauds, including antitrust violations, unfair
competition, and patent and IIlldemark infringements. See id. at 1896.
196. See id. at 1893.
197. See id. at 1916, 1936. These unsecured creditors are often IIlldc creditors or consumers, both

of whom are less sophisticated, Jess informed, and have less clout in the credit markets than the most
common secured lenders-that is, money center banks and finance companies. See SuwvAN ET AL.,
supra note 181, at 287-88, 293.
198. See LoPucki, supra note 177, at 1963-64. But see Susan Block-Lieb, The Unsecured
Creditor's Bargain: A Reply, 80 VA. L. REv. 1989, 1991 (1994) {challenging LoPucki's conclusion that
the subordination of secured debt to involuntaty debt is the most effective means of internalizing the
risk of exposure to claims brought by involuntaiy creditors)·.
199. Indeed, commentators have often noted that many ABS investors do not understand the risks
involved in securitization IIllnsactions. See supra notes 9-116; see also Frederick Dannen, 1he Failed
Promise ofAsset-Backed Securities. INSITIUTJONAL lNvEsroR, Oct. 1DAQ •t 260.
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securitization, even these unsecured creditors may not know how to eval
uate a finn with a securitized portfolio. They may not be equipped to
effectively analyze the extent to which risk is retained by the securitizing
finn or to understand how to quantify the finn's loss and prepayment
assumptions. Securitization documentation is considerably more complex
than the documents customarily prepared in connection with secured
lending, and the party conducting the diligence must be alert to the issues
of hidden liabilities, unacceptable operational constraints, and the various
economic, operational, and reporting obligations incurred. 200
Finally, the unsecured creditor must be prepared to respond to any
representations, warranties, and covenants found in the securitization doc
umentation that unduly restrict the finn's future ability to operate in a way
that benefits the creditor. The creditor should also be wary of any alter
ation in assumptions made at the time of the securitization that adversely
affects it. The unsecured creditor needs to know whether the transaction
will interfere with its contractual relationship with the debtor-originator
and, if so, whether the parties can make a correction in a previously neg
otiated interest rate. It is not at all clear, however, that the information
sought by even the most tenacious unsecured creditor will be discoverable
or comprehensible. 201 As such, it is unrealistic to assume that full
information and consent have informed the interest rate charged by these
largely uninformed or involuntary unsecured creditors.
To illustrate the extent to which unsecured creditors are excluded from
the pre-bankruptcy bargaining process, suppose the securitizing finn is a
consumer retailer and the receivables securitized are credit card accounts.
The consumer goods customer's purchases that result in accounts receivable
are purchased with service contracts or repair or replacement warranties,

200. For a discussion of the challenges facing parties that attempt to examine a securitizing
originator's portfolio of assets, see supra nole 116.
201. The fmancialliler.~ture has proudly proclaimed that securitization is advantageous because
a securitizing firm is not required to disclose to the public information about its business to the same
exlent it is n:quired to do so in connection with a direct public offering. Wben an originator securitizes
its assets, securities are issued by the affllialed SPC, r.~ther than directly by the issuer. Because the
substantive information relevant to the market includes (I) the asset pool's quality, (2) the presence and
nature ofany credit enhancement, (3) the tranSaction's sttucture, (4) an analysis of the entity providing
the servicing of these assets, and (5) the nature of the SPC itself, the amount and type of information
that needs to be disclosed is not of the same type and magnitude as would be the case if the originator
were the direc• security issuer; the complete business and financial histocy of the originator does not
have to be included in the security disclosure documents. Although the public disclosure that is
required for a public issuance of ABS is far greater than that n:quired for a privalely secured financing,
it does not rise to the level required of a firm that is directly issuing securities in the public markets.
This type of abbrevialed disclosure is less expensive, less time-<:onsuming to complele and assemble,
and does not require a firm to n:vcal itself for fuU public scrutiny. From the peiSpective of the
originator, this may prove to be a valuable advantage. See Barmat, supra nole 16, at 5 (noting that
nondisclosure is one of the compelling reasons to securitize assets).
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and these customers are entitled to their money back or an exchange if the
goods are defective.
If a portion of these credit card accounts are sold (securitized), and
therefore not available to satisfy the warranty claims of the originator's
customers,202 the purchase risks of the customers are increased and their
unsecured claims against the firm will be more difficult to satisfy. As a
result, consumers who purchase goods from firms that securitize a portion
of their assets are more likely to become unpaid unsecured creditors than
consumers who purchase from firms that have only secured credit. As
such, the securitizing firms should charge these consumers/potential unse
cured creditors lower prices. 203
If the consumers/potential unsecured creditors are unaware of the
retailer's securitization, the prices they are willing to pay for the goods of
securitizing firms will be unaffected by the securitization. The consumers
(and other unsecured creditors with claims against this retailer) will conse
quently pay higher prices than they should pay and the securitizing firm
will enjoy the transactional inefficiency surplus, at the expense of the
unknowing or involuntary unsecured claimants. 204
If a securitizing firm ultimately declares bankruptcy, uninformed and
involuntary unsecured creditors may find themselves in an even less advan
tageous position. Unless the integrity of the transaction's structure is
challenged, 205 a securitizing firm is transferring assets out of its potential
bankruptcy estate and consequently, in the event of a bankruptcy, these
assets are not available to the firm's unsecured creditors. As such, the
asset purchasers are not motivated to aid the firm in preserving the value
of the estate. Not surprisingly, the securitizing firm's unsecured creditors
are assuming a risk of nonpayment, as a result of the securitization, that is
arguably greater than the risk unsecured creditors experience when their
debtor borrows money on a secured basis.
In contrast, in a secured lending arrangement, if the debtor enters
bankruptcy, the collateralized assets remain in the debtor's estate and the
debtor gets the benefit (the upside potential) of any increase in value of a
collateralized asset during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. 206

202. Presumably, the credit can! accounts receivable sold (securitized) will be the highest quality
pool, leaving those accounts of the less credit-worthy debtors behind for the benefit of that originator's
general creditors in the event of a bankruptcy. See Gold & Schlueter, supra note 57, at !54-56
(outlining the asset-risk analysis conducted by rating agencies to identify and minimize potential credit
related problems).
203. These lower prices are the product-market equivalent of the higher interest rates that
unsecured creditors should charge to a firm that securitizes assets (or issues secured debt).
204. This illustration has its origin in Schwartz, supra note 120, at 16-18 (illustrating the failure
of secured debt, though not securitization, to adequately signal risks to creditors).
205. See infra subpan IV(D).
206. The secured creditors, if overcollateralized, are entitled to interest and contracted-for costs
pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 506(b) to the extent of any sutplus v'!lue in the collateral. See 11
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The secured creditor is required to participate in the debtor's bankruptcy
and is motivated to encourage the preservation of the estate; in the event
of a decrease in the value of the collateral, the estate may be the pool from
which it receives a portion of its recovery. 207 The secured creditor may
not just walk away from the debtor in bankruptcy with its collateral-it is
constrained by the automatic stay imposed at the time of the bankruptcy
filing, and the debtor has use of the collateral during the pendency of the
bankruptcy if the stay is not lifted. 208 Thus, the relationship established
between the debtor and the secured lender survives the debtor's
bankruptcy, which has the potential to benefit the unsecured creditors.
Because of the different relationship ABS purchasers have with their
financing seeking originator, the interest rates charged the securitizing orig
inator by its unsecured creditors should be higher than those charged to
debtors whose other funding comes from secured credit. If the unsecured
interest rate does indeed reflect the risk differential, then one can conclude
that securitization, pursuant to the analysis laid out by Jackson and
Kronman, is indeed efficient. This analysis, however, rests upon the
fundamental assumption of perfect information and fully informed consent
by the unsecured creditors. This assumption, subject to considerable chal
lenge when applied to secured credit, is even less reliable when a firm with
unsecured creditors is securitizing assets.

U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994). If. during !he pendency of !he bankruptcy, the collateral inc.,ases in value
in excess of the obligation owed to the secuROd party, that value is available for the benefit of the
debtor's unsecuROd eROditors. See ll U.S.C. § 506(a)-(b).
207. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 506(a), a claim is secuROd to the extent of the value of the
collateral and is unsecuROd as to any deficiency in the collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). An
undersecuROd claim is thus bifurcated into a secu"'d and unsecu"'d claim. The portion of the claim that
is unsecuROd is mated the same as any other unsecuROd claim. See id. § 506(a).
208. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code oudines the types and kinds of activities engaged in by
cROditors that must be halted once bankruptcy is declaROd. See I 1 U .S.C. § 362 (listing several activi
ties that a"' stayed once a bankruptcy petition is filed, including: judicial and administrative actions
against the debtor that could have been commenced befo"' bankruptcy, enforcement of judgments
against the debtor, actions to obtain possession of property of the estate, and actions to create or perfect
any lien against the property of the estate). Pursuant to the automatic-stay provision, all collection
efforts by cROditors must stop automatically upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. See id. § 362(a).
Furthermo.,, the stay freezes the cROditors' state-law relationships among themselves and maintains the
priority positions in effect upon filing. See id. CROditors are also Stayed from pursuing any and all
legal and administrative actions against the debtor and his property, including any action undertaken
to create or enforce a lien. See id. This means that secuROd cROditors may not enforce their security
inte.,sts by levying upon property in which they have a security inte.,st. See id. The stay with respect
to the collateral of a particular cROditor. however, may be lifted by a court following an application for
relief from the stay pursuant to§ 362(d). Section 362(d) sets out two separate grounds for relief from
the stay. First, a court will lift the stay if the cROditor. successfully claims that it lacks "adequate
protection. • Id. § 362(d). The second ground is relied upon when the debtor has no equity in the
property, and such property is not necessary for an effective reoQ!anization. See id.
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Equitable Challenges to Securitiltltion TTansactions

The best that may be concluded in the absence of empirical evidence
is that the justifications for securitization are unpersuasive and unproven.
Securitized transactions may be efficient, or they may be inefficient, with
unsecured creditors subject to effects which are in many circumstances
more detrimental than those effects they are subject to when their borrower
uses its assets as collateral for a secured loan.
Unsecured creditors of securitizing originators may be exposed to the
further risk that a bankruptcy court, in scrutinizing a structured finance
transaction, will reverse the asset transfer in the exercise of its equitable
discretion. The ensuing litigation will be expensive, time consuming, and,
until there has been a full resolution of this issue, will lead to even greater
uncertainty in the credit markets.
Bankruptcy courts' equitable powers were codified in section 105(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code. 209 That section authorizes a court to "issue any
order . . . necessary or appropriate to carry out provisions of this
title. "210 Notwithstanding the apparent breadth of this Code language,
the Supreme Court has taken a narrow view of its equitable powers under
In the last Supreme Court case decided under the
the Code. 211
Bankruptcy Act, Butner v. United States, 212 the Court addressed the
question of whether applicable state law or a "federal rule of equity"
should be applied in deciding which party had the right to rents collected
during bankruptcy. 213 The Court distinguished between bankruptcy
courts' powers as courts of equity and their equitable interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Act and recognized the importance of the courts' equity powers
in dealing with "particular, individualized problems. " 214 The Court,
however, made clear its hostility to a purely equitable interpretation of the
Code in refusing to adopt a uniform federal rule on the basis of "undefined
considerations of equity. " 215

209. See 11 U.S.C. § 10S(a).
210. /d.
211. Bankruptcy courts we~e mo~e liberal in the use of their equiiable powers under the
Bankruptcy Act. Their broad use of equiiable interpielations of the Act evolved from the efforts of
judges to fill in the gaps left by the language of the slatute. The Bankruptcy Act, which had not been
amended in many years, did not reflect the conunercial Iealities of the day. As such, judges we~e left
to use their equiiable disc~etion to further the underlying goals of bankruptcy. See Adam James
Wiensch, Note, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the Treatment ofPre-Bankruptcy Cade Law, 79
GEO. LJ. 1831, 1860 (1991).
212. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). Butner was decided with reference to the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act, but after Cong~ess's enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.
213. /d. at 49.
214. /d. at S6, SS-S6.
21S. /d. at S6.
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In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,216 the Supreme Court decided the
issue of whether collective bargaining agreements were covered by section
365(a) by looking to the plain meaning of the language of the Code. 217
The Court refused to consider the equitable, public-policy arguments advo
cating for collective bargaining agreements' exemption from this section
offered by the National Labor Relations Board and the union. 218 The
Court admonished bankruptcy courts to limit the use of their equitable
powers by requiring a written finding on the record if the "equities"
weighed in favor of the rejection of collective bargaining agreements. 219
The Supreme Court further refined the contours of its view of the
equitable powers of bankruptcy courts in Norwest Bank Worthington v.
Ahlers. m In Ahlers, the Court was faced with the question of whether
a claim for an exception to the absolute priority rule, supported by both
pre-Code practice and a variety of equitable justifications, should be
allowed. 221 The Court dismissed the equitable arguments offered by the
debtor and expressly stated, "[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the
bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of
the Bankruptcy Code. "222
216. 465 u.s. 513 (1984).
217. See id. at 521-23.
218. See id. at 525, 524-27. The Coun unanimously concluded !hat collective bargaining agree
ments were covered by § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code because, "by its tenns[, it] includes all
executory contracts except those expressly exempted. • ]d. at 521. The Coun observed that Congress
had expressly exempted collective bargaining agreements from other sections of the Code, thus indicat
ing its intent to include them under the language of§ 365(a). See id. at 522. The Coun's reading of
the Code in this case can be characterized as "teXrualism" because it strictly focused on the language
and strucrure of the Code, ignoring the public policy implications (and arguably the third-party effects)
of its interpretation. See Peter H. Carroll, ill, literalism: The United States Supreme Coun's
Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Coses, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ. 143 (1993); Carlos
J. Cuevas, Pliblic Values and the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEVS. J. 645, 645-46 (1996); Walter
A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Coun's Evolving "Plllin Meaning• Approach to
Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1636, 1638-39 (1993); Roben K. Rasmussen, A
Study ofthe Costs and Benefits ofTextualism: The Supreme Coun's Bankruptcy Coses, 71 WASH. U.
L.Q. 535, 565 (1993); Charles Jordan Tabb & Roben M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and
Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence ofthe Rehnquist Coun, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823, 825
(1991) (all acknowledging that textualism is a primary method of interpreting the Bankruptcy Code and
is one used extensively by the Supreme Coun).
219. See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 527. The Coun stated, "The Bankruptcy Code does notauthorize
freewheeling consideration of every conceivable equily, but rather only how the equities relate to the
success of the reorganization. • ld. It is interesting to note that organized labor successfully lobbied
for the legislative repeal of this decision. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994) (prohibiting the unilateral
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement by a trustee, requiring first a coun hearing and ruling);
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 98-882 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576 (containing several state
ments from congressional leaders who reference organized labor).
220. 485 u.s. 197 (1988).
221. See id. at 199. The debtors in Ahlers were farmers who promised to contribute their "labor,
experience, and expertise• to the reorganization of their farm in rerum for retaining an equicy interest
in it. The Coun rejected this unenforceable promise and held that there was not a permissible
exception to the plain statutory language of the absolute priorily rule. See id. at 203.C5.
222. Id. at 206.
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It is clear from this line of cases that bankruptcy courts do not have
unbridled equitable powers under section 105(a). Courts do, however,
have the power to scrutinize asset transfers and the circumstances sur
rounding such transfers. Such scrutinization may lead a court to conclude
(1) that the circumstances suggest that the asset transfer ought to be rechar
acterized as a transfer of collateral in connection with a secured loan,
rather than an asset sale; (2) that, because "economic prejudice caused by
continued entity separateness outweighs the potential prejudice that
accompanies consolidation, "223 the assets and liabilities of the SPC should
be substantively consolidated for bankruptcy purposes with the assets and
liabilities of the originator; or (3) that the asset transfer, in unjustly dimin
ishing the debtor/originator's bankruptcy estate, falls within the prohibi
tions of fraudulent transfer law. 224
If courts adopt any of these bases for concluding that securitization
transfers should be undone when the originator is in bankruptcy, further
harm will be done to the originator's unsecured creditors.
1. When the Equities Suggest that Assets- Transferred Are Really
Disguised Collateral for a Secured Loan.-If a transaction under the bank
ruptcy trustee's scrutiny involves the retention of some measure of
recourse, risk, or control by the originator in connection with the asset
transfer, 225 the trustee can make the argument that the transfer of assets
was a transfer of collateral for a loan, rather than a sale of assets. 226
Historically, courts have exercised some latitude in determining whether or
not a certain asset transfer was a sale or a transfer of collateral for a
loan. 227

223. J. Stephen Gilben, Note, Substantive Consolidation in Bankroptcy: A Primer, 43 VAND. L.
REv. 207, 208 (1990); see also Christopher W. Frost, Organizational Form, Misappropriation Risk,
and the Substantive Consolidation of Corporate Groups, 44 HAsTINGS L.J. 449, 449-51 (1993)
(discussing the effects of substantive consolidation).
224. See infra sections IV(D)(2}·(3).
225. If the value of the collateral is less than the debtor's outstanding obligations to the lender,
a lender with recourse may sue the debtor personally on the note, seeking full payment. See ROBERT
W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS 9 (1989). For a discussion of recourse and
retained risk, see supra notes 75, 77, 106.
226. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 271-72
(9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that, because the investor retained a degree of risk in connection with a
!Iansfer and the interest rate charged was tied to prevailing borrowing rates, the !Iansfer was a loan,
rather than a sale).
227. See id.; see also Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerbof, CharacterizPtion ofa Transfer
ofReceivables as a Sale or Secured Loan upon the Bankruptcy ofthe Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. LJ.
181, 183, 182-84 (1991) ("[A] bankruptcy court's conclusion that a tl3nsfer is indeed a secured loan
may depend on the context in which the court examines the issue."); Thomas E. Plank, 1he True Sale
ofLoans and the Role of Recourse, 14 GEO. MAsoN L. REV. 287. 290 (1991) ("[C]ourts do not rely
upon any universally accepted set of factors in detertnining whether a purported sale is a true sale or
merely a transfer as security for a secondary Joan."); Peter L. Mancini, Note, Bankruptcy and the UCC
as Applied to Securitization: Characterizing a Mon~ave Loan Transfer
f!S n Sale or a Secured Loan,
.
-s

1998]

Asset Securitization

639

Whether a particular asset transfer is a true sale or a secured loan is
not governed by a bright-line test. 228
Parties may intend one
characterization, but the facts and circumstances of the transfer may
suggest another.229 Courts faced with "true sale versus secured loan"
questions have made reference to a number of relevant factors, the pres
ence of a critical mass of which would suggest a true sale. These factors
include the intent of the parties as evidenced by their writings, 230 the
absence of recourse to the asset seller,231 the presence of a residual inter
est to be retained by the originator, 232 the sale price set at fair market
value by independent appraisers,233 the assumption of the bene.fits and
burdens of ownership by the purchaser, 234 and the acquisition of domin
ion and control over the assets by the acquirer. 235 Many securitization
73 B.U. L. REv. 873. 877, 877-82 (1993){"The UCC ••. does not establish ••• relevant guidelines
to detennine whether the parties intended a particular ttansfer to represent a loan with a security interest
or a sale.").
228. See Aicher & Fellerbof, supra note 227, at 182-84.
229. See, e.g., Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc. (In re S.O.A.W. Enters.,
Inc.), 32 B.R. 279,283 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (stating that even though the participation agreement

in a loan-participation anangement discussed the "'sale of a participation?" the arrangement should be
considered a loan because, in reality, it contemplated the making of a loan to be secured by collateral);
Boerner v. Colwell Co., 577 P.2d 200, 204-05 (Cal. 1978) (postulating that the substance, not the
form, of the ttansaction dictated whether the ttansfer of construction conttacts constituted bona fide
credit sales rather than usurious loans).
230. See, e.g., Hatoff v. Lemons & Assocs. (In re Lemons & Assocs.), 67 B.R. 198, 209-10
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (basing its decision on the weight of objective manifestations of the parties'
intent to consummate a sale transaction, including executed agreements and other documentary
evidence).
231. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, luc. v. Castle Credit Cmp., 602 F.2d 538, 542-44 (3d
Cir. 1979) (noting that the absence of recourse to the seller is one of several relevant factors in
detennining the existence of a uue sale).
232. See, e.g.,ln re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc., 23 B.R. 659, 661 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) ("A
security interest is indicated where the assignee retains a right to a deficiency on the debt ...."); First
Nat'! Bank v. Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. ll (In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. ll), 19 B.R. 609,
614-15 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (determining that because assignments ofaccounts receivable did not
divest the debtor of all interest in the receivables, the assignments were given as security for a bank
loan), ajf'd in part and rev'd in part, 32 B.R. 737 (W.D. Ky. 1983), ajf'd, 763 F.2d 188 (6th Cir.
!985); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Nixon Mach. Co. (In re Nixon Mach. Co.), 6 B.R. 847, 850 ( Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1980) ("A Chapter 11 ..• debtor's property generally is anything in which it has an
interest.").
233. S.e, e.g.,/nreCoronetCapital Co.,l42B.R. 78,80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992){stating that
a discrepancy between the interest rate due on the underlying note and the interest rate specified in the
participation is a factor indicating an intention to create a loan rather than a participation).
234. See, e.g., Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 500, 514-15 (!968)
(holding that because the taxpayer was required to pay an indexed interest rate on the exact amount of
the outstanding balance in connection with the ttansfer ofaccounts, and was further required to pledge
future accounts when an account the taxpayer characterized as sold became delinquent, such ttansfer
was deemed to be a secured loan), ajf'd, 426 F.2d 417 (6th Cir. 1970).
235. Courts have identified the following additional factors in determining whether a ttansfcr is
a true sale or secured loan:
a.
whether the transaction covers specifically identified receivables, rather than an

interest in a pooJ of receivables;
b.

whether notice ofllh8>llllll&blc of the receivableds-given<tolllmaoammt debtors;
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transactions, however, combine indicia of both a true sale and a secured
loan, which makes a court's ultimate decision an exercise in the weighing
and balancing of these factors. 236
Further confusing courts and complicating the true sale analysis is the
fact that an asset transfer may constitute a sale for accounting purposes and
yet not be deemed to be a sale pursuant to the equities of bankruptcy. 237
If certain specified indicia of recourse are present, 238 then the transaction
is considered a sale under the FASB rules. Bankruptcy courts, however,
have historically taken a broader view, giving consideration to a long list
of factors, including but not limited to, the presence of recourse when
analyzing the sale versus loan issue. 239 Bankruptcy courts, however,
have applied the "true sale" factors inconsistently.
Those transaction participants who exercise their creativity and
develop new types of securitization structures offer a further challenge to

c.

d.

whether the purchase price of the receivables is computed with reference to the
expected life of the receivables. rather than by means of some interest-like monthly
payment program. A purchase ofassets at a fixed discount. which covers projected
funding costs, is more like a sale than a purchase based on a floating rate, which
is typically found in commercial loans;
whether the purchaser has no ability to alter the terms of a sale after the closing
and the originator has no right to receive any SUI]llus collections of transferred

assets;
e.

whether the related books and records are transferred and delivered to the
purchaser. This may not be the case. however. if the originator contracts to

service the receivables.
See Dewhirst v. Cin"bank (In re Contractors Equip. Supply Co.), 861 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1988);
Glover, supra note 5, at 621; Peter H. Wei!, Bankruptcy Issues for the Secured Creditor, in AssET
BASED LENDING INCLUDING COMMERCIAL FINANCE AND ACQUISfTION FINANCING 1991, at 421, 424
26 ( PLI Commerical Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 563, 1991).
236. See, e.g., Major's Furniture, 602 F.2d at 544 (characterizing the legally relevant question
as "whether the nature of the recourse, and the true nalllre of the transaction, are such that the legal
rights and economic consequences of the agreement bear a greater similarity to a financing transaction
or to a sale" (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)).
237. Rules promulgated by the FASB have stated that a transaction should be treated as a true sale
rather than a secured loan for accounting pUIJlOSes if the following factors are present: "The transferor
surrenders control of the furore economic benefits embodied in the receivables ..•• The transferor's
obligation under the recourse provisions can be reasonably estimated • • • . The transferee cannot
require the transferor to repurchase the receivables ·except pursuant to the recourse provisions. •
ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS: ACCOUNTING SrANDARDS AS OF JUNE 1, 1990, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 77, at 755, 756-57 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1990). Bankruptey
courts, however, at times have nsed their equitable discretion to conclude that, notwithstanding the
presence ofseveral substantive indicia that an asset transfer was a true sale, the bankruptey court should
also consider the equities of the matter when construing the transfer. See, e.g., Hatoff v. Lemons &
Assocs. (In re Lemons & Assocs.), 67 B.R. 198, 210-13 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (weighing the sale
versus loan indicia, and concluding that the transfer was in fact a sale); see also supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
238. See supra note 106 (defining a "transfer with recourse").
239. See supra rext accompanying notes 216-25 (explaining how courts scrutinize and define asset
transfers).
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trustees who are inherently suspicious of this type of financing. 240 This
kind of financial creativity may provide the impetus for a court, already
uncomfortable about securitization's potential for circumventing the bank
ruptcy process, to recharacterize the asset transfer as a transfer of collateral
due to the presence of recourse.
Incontrovertibly, this discretion allows bankruptcy judges the latitude
to agree with a trustee who argues that securitization transactions are
nothing more than extravagant and embellished security interests designed
to circumvent the bankruptcy process, and to conclude that, notwithstand
ing the presence of certain "true sale" indicia, the asset transfer should be
deemed to be a secured loan. If a court is persuaded that securitization
financing is tantamount to a disguised secured financing transaction, it is
likely to look through the transaction's form and take steps to protect the
debtor's unsecured creditors from the effects of the complete removal of
valuable assets from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 241
Dlustrative of the uncertainty that reigns with respect to this issue is
the common reluctance on the part of legal advisors to definitively con
clude that a specific asset transfer is a true sale. 242 As stated previously,
240. For example, Professor Steven L. Schwarcz suggesiS a strucrure that theoretically enables an
originator to receive both the benefit of the upside potential of securitized asseiS as well as shielding
the asset investors from the effeciS of the originator's bankruptcy. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note
5, at 135-36. Professor Schwarcz explains in his article how selling receivables to an SPC, which in
rum transfers iiS receivables to an independent SPC, can best protect the originator's asseiS:
[ T]he originator first sells receivables to a wholly owned SP[C] in a transaction that
constirutes a true sale for bankruptcy purposes and thus achieves bankruptcy protection.
The wholly owned SP[C] then transfers iiS receivables to an independent SP[C] in a
transaction that constirutes a sale for accounting purposes but not necessarily for
bankruptcy purposes. The independent SP[C] issues securities in the capital markeiS to
fund the transfer. After the independent SP[C] pays off the securities, it can reconvey the
remaining receivables and collections to the wholly owned SP[C] without impairing the
accounting characterization as a sale. The wholly owned SP[C] is then merged into the
originator, or alternatively, the remaining receivables and collections are transferred back
to the originator as dividends. This SU11crure thus allows the originator to realize the
value of excess receivables and collections created by the original overcollateralization.
/d. at 142.
241. UCC § 9-102(1)(b) requires that, subject to certain exceptions, Article 9 will "apply to any
sale of accouniS or chattel paper. • U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1994). Section 9-302 requires that
purchasers of accouniS file a financing statement to perfect their interest in such accouniS. See id. § 9
302(1). If the purchaser fails to file and, thus, fails to perfect iiS interest, upon the debtor's bankruptcy
the trustee may avoid the asset transfer and rerum the asset to the debtor's bankruptcy estate. See id.
§§ 9-102, 9-302; supra note 158.
242. Historically, legal advisors would not give opinions with respect to bankruptcy issues, due
to the equitable discretion afforded bankruptcy couriS. As an increasing number of strucrured finance

transactions came to market in the 1980s, rating agencies began to require legal opinions on certain
bankruptcy issues that affected their rating process. See TriBar Report, supra note 54. at 718-20. See
generally George W. Bermant, 7he Role ofthe Opinion ofCounsel: A Tentative Reevaluation. 49 CAL.
Sr. BJ. 132 (1974) (discussing the need for accurate legal opinions to characterize transactions); Scott
FitzGibbon & Donald W. Glazer, Legal Opinions in Corporate Transactions: 7he Opinion on
Agreementsand/nstroments, 12 J. CORP. L. 657 (1987) (arguing that standard bankruptcy-qualification
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rating agencies responsible for evaluating the credit of the ABS put a spe
cial demand upon originator's counsel to opine that a transaction is struc
tured so that the purchasers of the ABS are isolated from the potential
bankruptcy of the originators. w As such it has become common practice
for law firms to deliver reasoned legal opinions as to the bankruptcy
remote nature of the transaction's structure. 244 Investors may not recog
nize the subtle, yet significant distinction between a "bankruptcy-remote"
structure and one that is "bankruptcy-proof" -which is to say, invulnerable
to the possibility of bankruptcy. 245
In addition, rating agencies may require that the transaction's structure
provide for a form of recourse to the originator2"6 or the requirement of
credit enhancement,247 and in such cases, it is even more difficult to
deliver the "true sale" opinion. This fact, coupled with rating agencies'
insistence upon "clean" opinions,248 has led in some instances to an
ethical race to the bottom, with those firms hungrier for lucrative struc
tured finance deals expressing a greater willingness to offer unqualified
opinions, even in the face of legal uncertainty. 249 Although more prudent

clauses in legal opinions should not prevent attorneys from advising clients about the reasonably
foreseeable bankruptcy implications of a ttansaction); Robert J. Harter, Jr. & Kenneth N. Klee, The
Impact ofthe New Bankruptcy Code on the "Bankruptcy Out" in Legal Opinion.s, 48 FORDHAM L. REv.
277 (1979) (discussing the effect of an enforceability opinion on a "bankruptcy out"); Special Comm.
on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n in Cooperation with
Corp. Law Comm., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. and Corp. Law Comm. of the Banking,
Corp., and Bus. Law Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Legal Opinion.s to Third Parties: An EDsier Path,
34 Bus. LAW. 1891 (1979) [hereinafter Legal Opinion.s] (discussing the importance of legal opinions
in corporate practice and advising how such opinions should be written).
243. Opinion negotiations between a rating agency and counsel to the securilizing originator have
as their central theme the struggle between the rating agency's desire to be able to hold the opining
counsel liable in the event a court concludes that the transaction was not "bankruptcy proof," and the
opining counsel's desire to insulate and protect itself from liability for false and misleading statements.
See Legalities in Rating Mortgage-Backed Securities, CREDITREviEW, Oct. 25, 1993, at 9, 9-11 (noting
that Standard & Poor's often attempts to reduce bankruptcy concerns by securing legal opinions from
counsel for "bankruptcy-remote" subsidiary companies that the subsidiary will not be consolidated
should the parent corporation become insolvent); Bottini, supra note 52, at 61 I; TriBar Report, supra
note 54, at 735-37 (arguing that in order to make lawyers willing to offer bankruptcy opinions, courts
should recognize the inherent uncertainties of bankruptcy equity power and hold opining counsel liable
only for negligence); Husisian, supra note 52, at 421.
244. See TriBar Report, supra note 54, at 721, 734.
245. See Dannen, supra note 199, at 261. In three well known cases, SPCs ftled for voluntary
bankruptcy, notwithstanding their bankruptcy-remote strucrure. See In re P.A. Bergner& Co. Holding
Co., 187 B.R. 964 (Bankr. E.D. Wise. 1995); In re Buckhead Am. Corp., 161 B.R. 11 (Bankr. D.
Del. 1993); In re Towers Fin. Corp., No. 93-41558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. fded Mar. 26, 1993).
246. See Curtin & Deckoff, supra note 38, at 204.
247. See Rosenthal & Ocampo, supra note 5, at 39.
248. A "clean opinion" is one that draws unqualified conclusions. TriBar Report, supra note 54,
at 721.
249. It is very difficult to impose malpractice liability on a law finn based upon the delivery of
a legal opinion if there is even a semblance of reasoning supporting the conclusions reached. Cf.
Richard E. Mendales, Looking Under the Rock: Disclosure ofBankruptcy Issues Under the Securities
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law firms have been willing to opine as to the efficacy of the transaction's
structure, they have more cautiously qualified their conclusions and out
lined the assumptions upon which their opinions are based. 250
The foregoing illustrates how vulnerable an asset transfer can be when
the transferor becomes a debtor in banlauptcy. Once banlauptcy is
declared, an aggressive trustee will be looking for any weakness in the pro
cess or structure and any inequity in the effects of the asset transfer to bol
ster its assertion that equitable principles demand a reversion of the trans
ferred assets to the debtor's banlauptcy estate. As the securitization of
lower quality assets by marginal originators becomes more common,
securitization market participants must be prepared for courts to denounce
such creative structures and take steps to unwind these transactions.
2. The Equitable Doctrine ofSubstantive Consolidation. -Substantive
consolidation is an equitable doctrine that involves the pooling of two or
more entities' assets and results in the claims of one of the entity's credi
tors being treated as claims against the common fund. 251 A court may

Laws, 51 OHIO Sr. LJ. 731, 715 (1996) ("It is difficult, but not impossible, to impose liability upon
attorneys for legal opinions."). During securitization's infancy, the "law" relii:d upon by ttansaction
advisors may be the lastttansaction's documentation; participants in the fmancial markets have become
very adept at relying upon previously created structures. The portfolio of securitization transactions
successfully brought to the market becomes the "common law" relied upon by future parties. Such a
transaction strucrure may suffice during the period where no coun or legislature has stated otherwise.
Su Telephone Interview with Professor Richard E. Mendales, University of Miami School of Law
(Aug. 28, 1996) (on file with the Texas Law Review); see also Thomas P. Hourican, Overview of
Rating Agency Criteria for Asset-Backed Transactions, in THE HANDBOOK OF AssET-BACKED
SECURmES, supra note 5, at 34 (stating that "[o]utside counsel to the seller should provide an
unqualified opinion indicating that the transfer • • . is sufficient to remove the receivables from the
seller's estate for puiposes of Section 541 of the [Bankruptcy] [C]ode and that Section 362(a) would
not apply ••• in the event of the seller's bankruptcy").
250. Opinions laden with foundational assumptions are known as "reasoned opinions." A
reasoned, "true sale" legal opinion applies the various true sale factors to the transaction at hand and
draws a qualified conclusion that the transfer is a true sale rather than a secured fmancing. See TriBar
Repon, supra note 54, at 721, 734. In a 1983 article, Moody's made a distinction between reasoned
opinions-in which the basis for reaching a conclusion is oudined in the opinion-and "unqualified"
or "unequivocal" opinions-in which, in Moody's view, the "risk attendant to the issue opined on has
in the opinion of such lawyer been 'substantially eliminated.'" TriBar Repon, supra note 54, at 734
(quoting Moody's Approach to Rating Bank-Supponed Debt Securities, 15 MOODY'S BOND SURVEY
3979, 3980 (1983)). The TriBar Opinion Committee found Moody's distinction between reasoned
opinions and unqualified opinions to be "unacceptably simplistic." TriBar Repon, supra note 54, at
734-35. The Repon by the Special Committee on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions takes
the position that no opinion should be drawn so broadly that the lawyer becomes generally responsible
for the legal or business risks inherent in a transaction. See Legal Opinions, supra note 242, at 1895.
Further, the Repon by the Special Committee makes clear that it is inappropriate to seek an
"unqualified opinion on an uncenain or disputed legal principle. An opinion cannot change the facts
or the state of the law." !d.; see TriBar Repon, supra note 54, at 726-27, 135.
251. In one of the early cases outlining tiie contours of the substantive-consolidation doctrine, the
Second Circuit upheld the lower coun's consolidation ofa liquidating debtor and its non bankrupt affil
iates because the affiliates were mere "instrumentalities of the bankrupt with no separate existence of
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decide to substantively consolidate a securitizing originator and its related
SPC if it appears that the two entities are perceived by the market as one
entity and the equities of the interest of the firms' creditors are best served
by a consolidation.252 As one conunentator noted, the trend in recent
years has been for courts to be more willing to order a substantive consoli
dation of assets for economically integrated affiliated entities, when such
an order will aid in the rehabilitation of the debtor and facilitate the admin
istration of the bankruptcy estate.253

their own," and because adherence •to the separate corporate entities theory would result in an injustice
to the bankrupt's creditors.• Soviero v. Franklin Nat'! Bank, 328 F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir. 1964).
Another court bas identified seven factors that should be considered in deciding whether a subslantive
consolidation of assets should be ordered. See In re Vecco Constr. Indus., 4 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1980). These factors are: (I) "the presence or absence of consolidated financial slatements, •
(2) "the unity of interests and ownership between the various corporate entities, • (3) "the existence
of parent and inter-corporate guarantees on loans, • (4) "the degree of difficulty in segregating and
ascerlaining individual assets and liabilities, • (S) "the transfer of assets without formal observance of
corporate formalities, • (6) "the commingling of assets and business functions," and (7) "the
profilabHity of consolidation at a single physical location." Id.; see also Eastgroup Properties v.
Southern Motel Ass'n, 935 F.2d 245, 249 (lith Cir. 1991) (holding that consolidation is appropriate
when the entities are subslantially identical and when the equities favor the consolidation); In re
Augie/Restivo Banking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 520 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that consolidation was
inappropriate when the debtors had little in common); In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 279-80
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a creditor's reliance was sufficient to make consolidation improper,
when the creditor had relied upon public manifeslations that a subsidiary's assets, liabilities, and
operations were separate from those of the parent); In re Food Fair, Jne., 10 B.R. 123, 126 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying the In re Vecco factors as a formula and not relying on the weighing and
balancing of equilable considerations); Joy Flowers Conti, An Analytical Model for Substantive
Consolidation ofBankruptcy C'a.!es, 38 Bus. LAw. 855, 862 (1983) {proposing an analytical model for
determining whether or not to apply subslantive consolidation in a bankruptcy case); Frost, supra note
223 (discussing how bankruptcy courts use the doctrine of subslantive consolidation to disregard the
separation between commonly owned corporations); Timothy J. Hogan, Substantive Consolidation:
Observations and Suggestions, 1986 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 63 (describing the evolution and scope
of"the doctrine of subslantive consolidation); Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent,
Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 589 (1975) (discussing the
problems arising when a corporation affiliated with another corporation becomes bankrupt); W'J!liam
H. Thornton, The Continuing Presumption Against Substantive Consolidation" !OS BANKING L.J. 448,
458 (1988) (analyzing the presumption against subslantive consolidation and concluding that
"[s]ubslantive consolidation should only be ordered over creditor opposition if the proponent has
successfully borne the burden ofproving either that ntisrepresenlarion has Iaken place or that the affairs
of the entities concerned are a hopeless bash").
252. A bankruptcy court ordered the subslantive consolidation of an SPC and an originator on the
basis of the court's facrual findings, which included its conclusion that the transfer involved the com
mingling of bank accounts, the payment of all expenses from one joint account, an enlangled relation
ship among the parties, and the reliance by creditors on the credit of the consolidated debtors. See In
re Buckhead Am. Corp., 161 B.R. 11, 13-15 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993). Consistent with the standard
announced in the leading subslantive consolidation cases, the court Slated that the benefit of consol
idation outweighed the prejudice that would result. See id. at 3.
253. See Pml.UP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS, PROBLEMS IN TilE
BANKRIJPTCYOR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING TilE LAW
OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES § 10.10.5 (1985 & Supp. 1994). Further factors courts have considered
in recent opinions include: (I) the degree of econontic integration of the components of corporate
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Courts have looked to Section lOS(a) of the Bankruptcy Code as the
source of their equitable powers to order a substantive consolidation. 254
Consistent with the language in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,
however, they have narrowly exercised these powers and have in certain
instances expressed a reluctance to consolidate affiliated corporations
because of the risk of injury to certain of the parties' other creditors.255
Only when it appears that the two entities being considered for consolida
tion have actually been functioning as one entity, and the determination to
consolidate will not unfairly prejudice creditors of the debtor, will a court
make this ruling. 256
There is authority, albeit limited, to support the consolidation of a
nondebtor (an SPC) into the bankruptcy case of a debtor (the
originator). 257 In such cases where courts have ordered a substantive
consolidation, the courts have found either that the affiliated nondebtor was

groups and their common conduct of a unital}' business, see, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 723,741-44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re IRCC Inc., 105 B.R. 237, 241-42
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); Holywell Cotp. v. Bank of N.Y., 59 B.R. 340,347 (S.D. fla. 1986); In
re Tun:ad, 45 B.R. 658 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1985), ajj'd, 59 B.R. 973 (N.D. Okla. 1986); (2) to what
degtee the creditor relied on the credit of the entetprise, see, e.g., Eastgroup Properties, 935 F.2d at
251; In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 744 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. !985); (3)
whether the new entity intermingled formerly separate accounts, su, e.g., Drabvkin v. Midland Ross
Cotp. (In re Auto Train Cotp.}, 810 F.2d 270,276 (D.C. Cir. 1987); ChemicalBankN.Y. Trust Co.
v. Kheel (In re Seatrade Cotp.}, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Murray Indus., 119 B.R.
820, 831 (Bankr. M.D. fla. 1990); (4) whether the new entity intermingled formerly separate assets,
see, e.g., In re Balcer & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc., 78 B.R. 139, 142 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re
Richton Int'l Cotp., 12 B.R. 555, 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); and (5) the guidance provided by veil
piercing jurisprudence, see, e.g., FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1992).
254. See, e.g., Colonial Realty, 966 F.2d at 59, 61; see also In ,. Richton Int'l Cotp., 12 B.R.
555, 557 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
255. See, e.g., Drabvkin, 810 F.2d at 277-78 (denying trustee's nunc pro tunc consolidation of
a subs!dial}''s assets into the parent's bankruptcy estate because it would be dettimental to the creditor's
reliance); Kheel, 369 F.2d at 848 ("Equality among creditors who bave lawfully bargained for different
treatment is not equity ..• , and the argument for equality has a specially hollow ring when made by
the United Stares whose priority over other creditors will necessarily be enbanced by baving the assets
of all these cotparations thrown into hotchpot."); In re DRW Property Co., 54 B.R. 489, 497 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1985) (refusing to order a consolidalion of assets among affiliated entities because the
potential harm to creditors outweighed the benefits of substantive consolidation); In re Snider Bros.,
Inc., 18 B.R. 230, 238-39 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (denying a substantive consolidation request by
unsecured-creditors committees for six cotparate debtors). See generally Frost, supra note 223, at 449
(presenting an economic analysis of substantive consolidation and limited liability in bankruptcies
involving affiliated cotparations).
256. BLUMBERG, supra note 253, § 10.1.6.
257. See, e.g., Bracaglia v. Manzo (In re United Stairs Cotp.), 176 B.R. 359, 369 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1995) (allowing substantial consolidation of a nondebtorafter applying a balancing of equities
test); In re 1438 Meridian Place, N.W., Inc., IS B.R. 89, 96-97 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981) (relying on
traditional veil-piercing jurisprudence in reaching its decision to consolidate a debtor with a nondebtor);
see also Patrick C. Sargent, Bankruptcy Remote Finance Subsidiaries: The Substantive Consolidation
Issue, 44 Bus. LAW. 1223, 1233-36 (1989) {discussing consolidation of a debtor with a nondebtor
affiliate). But see Raslavich v. 1m S. Davis Storage Co., (In re 1m S. Davis, Co.), No. 92-142595,
1993 WL 384501, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. SepL 22, 1993) (holding that consolidating a debtor and
nondebtor violates the BankruPII!!I-~s.n:quiRIIIJimiS.for.CIIIIImeneing minvolumaty case).
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the "alter ego" of the debtor, or that elements of fraud existed in the rela
tionship between the parties. 258
Because of the substantial implications the risk of substantive consol
idation has on the market for asset-backed securities,259 rating agencies,
in addition to requiring "true sale" opinions, require that counsel for secu
ritization originators represent that all steps have been taken to minimize
the chance that a court will substantively consolidate the originator and its
affiliated SPC. 260 Counsel, however, find it much more difficult to
deliver this kind of opinion because of the opinion's forward-looking
perspective. 261 The TriBar Opinion Committee has described a substan
tive consolidation opinion as an
opinion as to a discretionary, equitable judgment to be made in the
future, in the context of the congressional goal of promoting
reorganizations, with respect to the interplay of filets, circumstances,
relationships, and other considerations, some of which may exist at
the time the opinion is rendered and some of which may arise in the
future. 262
Because of the nature of the equitable jurisdiction bankruptcy courts have,
opining counsel traditionally include a litany of qualifications and assump
tions in their opinions in order to avoid potential misunderstandings con
cerning the definitive nature of any conclusions drawn. 263 These opinion

258. See In re 1438MeridianPlace, N.W.,lnc., 15 B.R. 89, 'Y1 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981) (deciding
to substantively consolidate nondebtor aff'~iates with a debtor because such nondebtors were the alter
egos of the debtor's shareholders); Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941)
(basing its decision to substantively consolidate a debtor and its aff'~iated nondebtor on the presence
offraud); Mark L. Prager & Jonathan A. Backman, Pursuing Alter-Ego liability Against Non-Bankrupt
Third Parnes: Structuring a Comprehensive Conceptual Framework, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 657, 706
(1991) (arguing that substantive consolidation provides a "more coherent and equitable method for
dealing with excessively entangled entities" than does the alter ego doctrine). But cf. Baker Ostrin, A
Proposal to Limit the Availability of Substantive Consolidation of Solvent Entities with Bankrupt
Affiliates, 91 COM. LJ. 351, 363 (1986) (suggesting that the remedy of subSlalltive consolidation be
limited to cases in which there has been a fraudulent representation).
259. In the absence of complete credit enhancement or over-collateralization, the rerum of the
transferred assets into the estate of the debtor means that such assets are subject to the claims of the
debtor's unsecured creditors. See supra note 158. This liability clearly diminishes the security and
value of the purchasers' investment in the ABS.
260. Rating agencies are going to be fundamentally concerned with the risk that a coun will bring
a solvent, affiliated SPC into its parent's bankruptcy proceeding. See Sa11:ent, supra note 257, at 1233
34.
261. See TriBar Report, supra note 54, at 727.
262. ld.
263. According to the TriBar Report, opining counsel should:
(i)
state[] that subSlalltive consolidation is an equitable doctrine, that relevant facts may
arise in the furure, and tha.t couns have accorded different degrees of imponance
to different facrual matters;
(ii) assume[] that the entities involved will act in accordance with limitations designed
to promote separateness drafted into the rel~vant documents;
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guidelines make clear how difficult it is for legal counsel to draw definitive
conclusions when the issue concerned is an equitable matter.

3. The Application of a Quasi-Fraudulent Conveyance Analysis.
Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides authority for a trustee to
challenge a transfer of assets that was actually fraudulent or constructively
Section 548, as well as state fraudulent transfer
fraudulent. 264
265
statutes, sets out very clear conditions under which a transfer can be
avoided. 266
Specifically, transfers that run afoul of fraudulent
conveyance law are those made with the "actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any entity to which the debtor was" indebted, "or became"
indebted "on or after the date that such transfer was made. "1ST In
addition, trustees may avoid transfers that are made for less than reason
ably equivalent value, and made when the debtor, irrespective of its
intention, (1) becomes insolvent, (2) was engaged in business with unrea
sonably small capital, or (3) intended to incur debts that would be beyond
its ability to pay. 268

(iii)

assume[] a number of objective facts which have been drafted into the documents
to support separateness;
(iv) assume[] certain subjective or conclusocy facts, such as the newly-created entity bas
"sufficient employees" and will not be bound by business decisions of the parent
without independent approval by the newly-created entity pUISUant to its own
corporate governance procedures;
(v)
assume[] the absence ofany factors inconsistent with the other express assumptions;
aod
{vi) qualif[y] the opinion by staling that there is no case directly on point and that there
are uncertainties in rendering a substantive consolidation opinion.
ld. at 726-27.
264. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
265. In addition, § 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code incorporates stare fraudulent transfer law aod
authorizes the trustee to avoid any transfers by the debtor that an unsecured creditor with an allowable
claim under§ 502(e) of the Bankruptcy Code could avoid under state fraudulent transfer law. See id.
§ 544(b).
266. The modem fraudulent transfer statutes were derived from the Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eiiz.
c.5 (1571). The statute applied to conveyances made with the intent to "dclaye hynder or defraude
Creditors and others of theyr juste aod lawfuii Actions Suites [aod] Debtes." /d. At present, thirty-six
states aod the Disnict of Columbia have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act {UFTA), see
7A U.L.A. 209 (Supp. 1997), and its precursor, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA),
is in effect in five states. See 1A U.L.A. 159 (Supp. 1997). Both statutes are considered to be
codifications of cases applying the Statute of Eiizabeth. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code empowers
a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a transfer of a debtor's property, or any obligation incurred by the
transfer, that was fraudulently made or incurred under certain defined circumstances within one year
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 548. See generally Douglas G. Baird
& Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829
(1985) (analyzing fradulent conveyance as a species of contract law); Michael L. Cook & Richard E.
Mendales, 7he Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: An Introductory Critique, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87
(1988) {comparing the UFTA to the UFCA aod the Bankruptcy Code).
267. 11 U.S.C. § 548{a)(l).
268. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to avoid transfers that occurred within
one year of bankruptcy, id. § ~S(llY.''aili!'tlre-UP'l'Xefenl!ra!lY'lillo~arellllli'rs'i j'l%riod of four years
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To the extent securitization transactions involve actual fraud, trustees
can avoid the asset transfer based upon the clear language of section 548
of the Bankruptcy Code. It is worth noting, however, that the harm faced
by the originator's unsecured creditors as a result of the fraud is not neces
sarily attributable to securitization as a method of financing, but to the
originator's fraudulent behavior. Such fraud could occur in a secured
credit context as well. Moreover, if there is less than reasonably equiv
alent value exchanged at a time when the originator is in a precarious
financial condition, the trustee has a clear basis for avoiding an asset trans
fer as a constructive fraudulent conveyance. Market forces provide a
check, however, on whether the securitized assets transferred to the SPC
are in exchange for "reasonably equivalent value," 269 and even low qual
ity assets transferred in exchange for a deeply discounted amount would
probably survive the scrutiny of a court under a constructive fraudulent
conveyance challenge. 270 Indeed, due to the scrutiny imposed by rating
agencies, credit enhancers, and the various other market participants, secu
ritization may present fewer opportunities for self-dealing than alternative
financing methods.
As stated previously, the movement of assets away from the reach of
the originator's unsecured creditors is central to securitization's structure.
In fact, it is the transaction's bankruptcy-remote feature that has attracted
this year's market to invest over one-hundred billion dollars in asset-backed
securities. 271 This removal of valuable assets from the reach of the origi
nator's unsecured creditors is the type of harm the fraudulent conveyance
doctrine is designed to address. 212 The debate in recent years concerning
the proper limits of fraudulent transfer law has been in the context of cer
tain modern day transactions that have resulted in an unjust diminution of
the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 273 Because courts have applied the

from the tr.msfer in which to commence an avoidance suit. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr § 9
& cmt., 7A U.L.A. 666 (1985). If the tnlnsfer occurred more than a year before the petition, the
trustee may be able to avoid it by using state law pursuant to § 544(b), even though it cannot avoid it
under§ 548. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).
269. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A).
270. This is particularly ttue when asset-backed securities are sold in the public markets.
271. See supra note 46.
272. In an article examining the disclosure of bankruptcy issues under the securities laws,
Professor Mendales observed that substantive consolidation and recharacterization of ttue sales as
secured loans "collapses analytically" into the fraudulent conveyance model. Mendales, supra note
249, at 783, 782-83.
273. See, e.g., Bai!d & Jackson, supra note 266 (arguing that fraudulent conveyance Jaws should
not be used to protect debtors in foreclosure sales because such efforts might be counterproductive);
David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REv. 73 (1985) (discussing the
impact of six different leveraged-buyout tn!DSaction sttucrures on bankruptcy estates); Emily L.
Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against Panicipants in a Leveraged Buyout, 72 MINN. L. REv. 449 (1988)
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fraudulent conveyance doctrine to challenge transfers made in connection
with leveraged buy-outs, 774 there is a precedent for expansion of this
doctrine. 775 Furthermore, securitization results in an increase in a firm's
unsecured creditor's overall post-lending risk-another evil fraudulent
transfer law addresses.
To illustrate, when unsecured creditors lend money, they do so at an
interest rate that reflects the debtor's level of risk at the time of lending.
Once the debtor receives the unsecured credit, it then has an incentive to
engage in risky behavior with the promise of not only great rewards but
also the corresponding chance of losing it all. In many instances,
unsecured creditors have neither the knowledge nor the money to bargain
for an interest rate that reflects a change in behavior. Insolvent firms are
especially motivated to gamble in this way because, in the event of
liquidation, the firm owners receive nothing; if the firm does reap a profit,
however, it is the owners-not the creditors-who receive the windfall. 276
When this risky behavior is financed by a firm securitizing its highest
quality assets, the unsecured creditors may find themselves in an even
worse position.
They remain subject to securitization's negative
externalities777 and have a lower chance of repayment upon liquidation,
without having been paid an interest rate that reflects this risk. At a

(analyzing !he ways couns have approached creditors' rights in !he context of LBOs financed either by
independent lenders or by selling shareholders); Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper limits of
Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8 BANKR. DEVS. J. 55 (1991) (discussing !he limits of ftaudulent transfer
law while professing to remain faithful to its basic principles).
274. S.e, e.g., United States v. Tabor Coun Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986). But
see Kupett v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 847-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to find a ftaudulent conveyance
in !he instance of the sale of a debtor corporation m a leveraged buyout); Mellon Bank v. Metro
Communications, Inc. (In re Metro Communications, Inc.), 95 B.R. 921, 932 ( Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989)
(asserting that !he banktuptcy starute prohibiting ftaudulent transfers applies to leveraged buyouts),
amended 135 B.R. 17 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) and aff'd in pan and rev'd in pan, 135 B.R. 15 (W.D.
Pa.), rev'd, 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schonenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 500
(Bankr. N.D. DI. 1988) ("Although ••• ftaudulent conveyance laws generally are applicable to
[leveraged-buyout] ttansactions, a debtor cannot use these laws to avoid any and all [such
ttansactions]. ");Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc., 91 B.R. 430,439-40 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988)
(detennining !hat !he plaintiffs failed to show a ftaudulent conveyance because !hey did not prove !hat
!he defendant was insolvent at !he time of the leveraged buyout). See generally Baird & Jackson, supra
note 266, at 850-54; Carlson, supra note 273, at 73; Sherwin, supra note 273, at 449.
275. Professors Baird and Jackson argued in Fraudulent Conveyance Law and its ProperDomain
that "using the ftaudulent conveyance remedy to undo bad deals ... can be justified only if its benefits
are greater than !he costs of the unceltainty such a rule brings." Baird & Jackson, supra note 266, at
838. "Fraudulent conveyance law should never apply to anns-lenglh ttansactions, even if it appears
after the fact that !he debtor's actions injured !he creditors." !d. at 854.
276. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 144, at 373.
277. Securitization's negative externalities include !he diminished chance for repayment, even in
!he absence ofliquidation, because !he ~rm securitized its highest quality assets; the complete severance
of !he securitized assets from !he bankruptcy estate of !he debtor firm; !he absence of debtor
monitoring; and !he debtor's freedom to waste !he consideration it gained from the sale of its assets.
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rrununum, a coun might find that the securitization transaction did not
serve to advance the creditors' collective interests. 278
Is there a place within the domain of fraudulent conveyance law for
the avoidance of a transaction that is designed to manipulate a debtor's
assets so as to move them from the reach of its unsecured creditors? Is it
a fuiling of fraudulent transfer law not to provide a cause of action to
address such a harm? Is there room within bankruptcy couns' narrowly
circumscribed equitable powers for an extension of the fraudulent transfer
doctrine? Will such a pragmatic judgment survive appellate review?279
If not, should there be a legislative response to this identified harm? In the
coming years, as the asset-backed securities market continues its expansion,
couns and legislatures may increasingly be persuaded that the answer to
these questions is "yes," and we may see the evolutionary development of
what may be characterized as quasi-fraudulent conveyance jurisprudence.
V.

The Unsettled Nature of the Law Relating to Structured Finance
As more securitizations come to the market, the extent to which the

present state of the law does not neatly fit this transaction is becoming
increasingly clear. 280 One illustration involves the threshold issue of
whether interests in asset pools are "securities" under the Securities Act of
1933 (the 1933 Actf81 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

278. The diminished incentive and opportunity for the monitoring of the debtor may. however,
provide in some cases greater opportunity forfraudulentbehavior. See Hilary Rosenberg, The Amazing
Towers Financial Affair, lNS1TIUilONAL INVESTOR, June 1994, at 126.
279. Equity, in a bankruptcy context, can be viewed as a form of legal p13gmatism. Legal
p12gmatism has been described as "a theory of law that asserts that 'judges do and should make

whatever decisions seem to them best for the community S future•. not counting any fonn of consistency
with the past as valuable for its own sake.'" Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE
L.J. 409, 413 (1990) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 95 (1986)). If bankruptcy courts
7

exercise p12gmatic judgments in their review of securitized asset transfers, they could rely upon their
equitable powers ro reach a just result.
280. For example, the securitization of pools of assets is in pan governed by the Invesanent
Company Act of 1940; issues remain open under this Act. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1994 &
Supp. 1995). The 1940 Act requires that an entity principally engaged in owning or holding
"securities" must register with the SEC as an "invesanent company," unless one of the statutory
exemptions applies. ld. at§ 80a-3(a)(3). Because of the burdensome nature of registration under the
1940 Act, securitization participants gene131ly seek to have the transaction fall within one of the
statutory exemptions. Until recently. however, securitization transactions did not fit neatly into the
categories of invesanent companies outlined in the 1940 Act because of the statute's focus on the types
of assets securitized, rather than on the economic principles underlying the transaction. As a result,
similar types of securilizations were treated differently under the 1940 Act, depending upon the types
of assets transferred by the originator. See generally Invesanent Company Act Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 270
(1996); 1 FRANKEL, supra note 5, § 3.15.2.
281. The 1933 Act imposes standards of disclosure and requires the filing of a registration ·
statement with the SEC in connection with any public offering of non-.:xempt securities. See Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994).
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1934 Act). 282 Notwithstanding the developed jurisprudence in this area,
the issue has not yet been definitively resolved. Courts and the SEC have
tried to fit asset-backed instruments into the definition of "security" found
in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, but because securitization involves the par
tial metamorphosis of an obligation from a contract to a form of personal
property, the current securities-related jurisprudence does not fully resolve
the ambiguity. 283 Courts have reached conflicting resolutions of this
question, often in response to arguments focusing upon different attributes
of the interests at issue. 284 While the current, prevailing view is that

282. The 1934 Act imposes standards of disclosure aod liability for cenain types of fraudulent
statements or omissions. as well as registration and ongoing reporting requirements for certain publicly
held issuers. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
283. See 2 FRANKEL, supra note 5, § 9.16 to -.17.2. Professor Frankel explains that the policies
of both contract and property Jaw include creating cenainty and predictability to reduce the panics'
planning and transaction costs, but the rules under contract aod property have different focuses.
Contract Jaw focuses on the panics to the contract and their specific agreement, whereas property Jaw
focuses upon a bundle of rights held by panicipants in the market. The different emphasis under these
respective classifications can potentially result in different rules. See id.; see also Jay M. Feinman,
The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REv. 661, 673 (1989) ("Classification is a shaping
and developing of traditional systematic conceptions and traditional systematic categories in order to
organize the bndy of legal precepts so that they may be: (I) [s]taled effectively with a minimum of
repetition, overlapping, and potential conflict, (2) administered effectively, (3) taught effectively, and
(4) developed effectively for new situations." (quoting Roscoe Pound, Classification ofLaw, 37 HARV.
L. REv. 933,944 (1924))); Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure ofMarkets: The Role ofContract
and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REv. 389, 392 & n.l3 (1993) (descnbing the contract prototype as a
relationship consisting of promises enforceable by Jaw and the property prototype as a relationship
between a person wi!h property rights and olher people, with rights ranging from the right to entJy and
use of the property to entitlements to exclude o!hers from the property).
284. The SEC said in Union Home Loans, Exchange Act Release No. 19,346, [1982-1983
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) , 83,308, at 85,681 (Dec. 16, 1982), !hat whether a
mongage-backed security is a security ora conunercial Joan depends upon whether it falls within§ 2(1)
of the 1933 Act's definition of "invesanent contracts." Id. at 85,682 (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,353 (1943)). Section2(1) of the 1933 Actdefmes the tenn security to
include "'certificates ofinterest orparticipation in any profit-sharing agreement," "investment contract."
and, "in general, any interest or insnument conunonly known as a 'security.'" Securities Act of 1933
§ 2{1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1994). The defmition of security announced in SECv. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293 (1946). focuses on invesanent contracts. Id. at 297-301. The Coun in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), discussed the "risk capital test," id. at 857 n.24,
but declined to adopt the test, stating that risk-capital would not apply to this case even if they had
adopted iL The Forman Coun also examined the "economic realities" test, describing it as a "basic
principle test that has guided all of the Coun's decisions in this area." Id. at 848, 848-51. Both W.J.
Howey and Forman have provided lower courts with some guidance. For example, one district coun
has held that mongage-backed securities are not invesanent contracts because !hey do not meet the
Howey test. See In re Epic Mongage lns. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1988) (setting
forth the four elements of the Howey test), off'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Foremost Guar.
Corp. v. Meritor Sav. Bank, 910 F.2d 118 (4!h Cir. 1990); see also In re National Mongage Equity
Corp. Mongage Pool Cenificates Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 497, 501-05 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (deciding
that mongage-backed cenificates were not invesanent contracts under the Howey test and, therefore,
not securities). The National Mongage conn based its findings on the fact (1) that the investors were
investing in loans, not in the business of the issuer; (2) that there was no conunon-enterprise risk; (3)
that there was a recourse provision in !he invesanent contract; and (4) that the investors did not rely
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ABS are securities, especially when ABS investors are not individually
negotiating their investment, as is the case when ABS are offered in the
public markets, courts continue to rely upon a facts-and-circumstances
analysis. 285
In addition to securities-related issues, these transactions implicate
multifarious issues in many other areas of the law,2&> and yet few struc
tured finance transactions have been examined by courts. As such, the
market has not had the benefit of courts' studied analyses of these transac
tions and their effects upon various market participants. 287 In a hurried
effort to keep up with the evolving market, there have been numerous stat
utory revisions and new rulemaking in recent years, all designed to address

on the efforts of others for profitabililty, other than poltfolio selection prior to the investtnent. Id. at
503-{)5.
285. The party arguing that the instrumems are not securities has the burden of demonstrating that
the investors are active lenders and not passive investors. Ultimately, the resolution of the issue is fact
specific and factors such as the documentation of the arrangement between the parties, the nature of
the panics' negotiations, whether the particular investors needed the protection of the securities acts,
and whether the investor was acting as a "lender" or was purchasing the instrument as a passive
investor are factors courts consider in reaching their decisions. See I FRANKEL, supra note 5, § 1.1.
But see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d !534, 1538-40 (lOth Cir. 1993)(holding that pools
of automobile-loan receivables sold to financial institutions were not securities under the !933 Act
definition). See generally Park McGinty, What Is a Security?, !993 WIS. L. REv. !033, !103.06
(discussing the question of whether or not ABS are securities).
286. Professor Frankel succinctly made this point when she wrote:
The legal issues that securitization raises touch on almost every legal area: banking and
bankruptcy, securities acts and the Uniform Commercial Code, contract, property, and
fiduciary iaw. The law of securitization cannot focus on lypes of instruments,
transactions, institutions, laws, or principles because it touches on all of these.

Securitization is a process.
I FRANKEL, supra note 5, at x!Vii.
287. The market has not fully understood the nature of ABS, and trading prices for ABS have,
in some circumstances, reflected this confusion. Investors insist upon a triple-A credit rating (and as
such. credit enhancement is almost always an element of the transaction). and according to one
observer, ABS trade like a "weak- or ntiddling-A security." The observation has been made by one
Wall Street participant that an "A• rated originator can raise funds in the bond market fifteen to twenty
basis points less than through a securitization. See Dannen, supra note 199, at261.
Furthermore, even the regulatory bodies may not understand the nature of the product they
regulate. For example, the California Departtnent of Corporations recently began enforcing an
unpublished policy whereby they reject any asset-backed securities registration application unless the
securities are backed by third-party credit enhancement equal to at least 13% of the outstanding prin
cipal balance, notwithstanding the rating of the securities and the fact that the California Department
of Corporations allows an exemption for evidences of indebtedness (which does not include pass
through securities) rated in the top four rating categories. See Rodney S. Dayan, Cu"t/11 Legal
Developments in Securilkation, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECU1U11ZATION 7, 24-26 ( PLI Comm.
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-677, 1993). Thus, investtnent-grade ABS structured
as pass-througbs are subject to registration under Califontia's blue sky laws and will be approved only
with a 13% credit enhancement arrangement in place. Not surprisingly, pricing for these highly rated
securities does not reflect the costs incurred by the issuer in obtaining an "AA• or "AAA • rating, and
as such, securitization can be quite an expensive funding method. Accordingly, this funding strategy
may not be appropriate for every company to which it is being marketed. See id.
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the unique issues raised by securitizations. 288 Because of the complexity
and ambiguity of these transactions, and uncertainties and gaps in the law
relating to securitization,289 many courts examining a collapsed structured

288. For example, in 1992, lhe SEC proposed a new rule under lhe 1940 Act for lhe purpose of
excluding certain issuers !hat pool income-producing assets and issue securities backed by !hose assets
from lhedefinitionof"investmentcompany." ThenewRule3a-7, adopted in November 1992, perntits
strucblred fmancings to publicly offer securities in lhe United Star:s wilhout regisr:ring under lhe 1940
Act and complying wilh lhe 1940 Act's substantive conditions if lhe financing meets specified
conditions. These requirements include !hat issuers must (1) issue primarily fixed-income securities,
wilh payments based upon cash flow derived from !he pooled assets; (2) offer oniy higbly mt:d fixed
income securities to lhe public; (3) hold substantially all of lhe fmancing's assets, wilh limited
exceptions, until marurity; and (4) deposit assets, cash flows, and olher property not needed for lhe
fmancing's opemtions in a segregated account maintained by an independent trust:e. InvCSbnent
Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1997 ). The stated purpose of Rule 3a-7 is to remove
"an unnecessacy and unint:nded barrier to !he use of strucblred financings in all sectors of lhe
economy, including lhe small business seetor." See 51 Fed. Reg. 56,248 (1992).
Moreover, tax law reganling securitizing entities has been undergoing revision. Recently, lhe
Small Business Job Prot:ction Act of 1996 created a new tax entity for usc in securitization
transactions. known as lhc "financial asset securitization investment trust" or "FASIT." Small Business
Job Pror:ction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1621, 110 Stat. 1755, 1858-68 (codified at 26
U.S.C.A. §§ 860H, 8601, 860K, 860L (West Supp. 1997)). A FASIT is a pass-lhrough vehicle,
which means !hat all income, gain deduction, loss, and credit pass-lhrough to lhe holder of!he FASIT's
ownership inr:rest. The impebiS behind !his new creation is to make it easier for lenders to pool assets
and to issue to !he public debt secured by such assets at a lowercostlhan under previous law. Entities
wiU not be able to elect FASIT stabiS until !he Seprember I, 1997 effective date. See Willys H.
Schneider, FASrrs Provide N.:w Flexibility, Challenges, AssET SALES REP., Sept. 30, 1996, at I,
available in 1996 WL 5618245. Thomas Humphreys and John Fernando bave notcd !hat:
From a tax standpoint, lhe primacy concern [in a strucblred financing] is wilh the tax
treatment of lhe [SPC] .
• • • First, and most important, !he [SPC] cannot pay a corporare level tax, i.e., it must
be "transparent" from a tax srandpoint.
• • • A second concern is timing and chamct:r of lhe income to lhe Investor and !he
[SPC] •
• • • A lhinl concern is timing and chamcrer of income (or loss) to the [originator].
ThomasA. Humphreys &John C. Fernando, Tax Treatment ofSirucJUredFinance Transactions 1025,
1030 ( PU Tax Law & Estar: Planning Course Handbook Series No. 393, 1994).
Additionally, the Office of lhe Comptroller of the Currency recently issued new asset
securitization guidelines. These guidelines "focus on lhe need for bankers to understand fully !he risks
involved in securitization and to take sr:ps to manage !hose risks effectively." OCC Issues Asset
Securitiztztion Guidelines, O.C.C. News Release 96-104 (Sept. 25, 1996), available in 1996 WL
539961.
Finally, Congress introduced a bill known as the Business, Commercial, and Community
Development Secondacy Market Development Act, which acconling to its billing, was designed to
"prom or: economic growth and credit formation by facilitating lhe development ofa secondacy market
for business, commercial, and community development debt and equity investments." H.R. 2600,
103nl Cong. (1993). The Community Development Banking and Financial Instibltions Act of 1994,
12 U.S.C.S. § 4701 (Law. Co-op. 1997 ), incorpomtcd lhe substance of thar bill through provisions
relaxing capital requirements and other regulations for privare sector market loans for small businesses.
S.e Alternative Lenders Get Assistance, SO CONG. Q. ALMANAC 100, 102 (1994).
289. Bank credit can! issuer-; are vulnemble to exttaonlinacy losses in the event !hat their
securitized credit card accounts are sold with recourse. If these accounts are not paid, they may be
rerurned to the bank's balance sheets. Because no capital is required to be set aside to cover such
losses, these banks will be exposed to large loan losses. "A prime reason for securitization on the pan

654

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 76:595

financing transaction may not completely appreciate the full measure of
issues before them. Moreover, due to the inadequacy of the information
surrounding these transactions, the parties participating in the public and
private debt markets, including the unsecured creditors of the world, are
not making their decisions with the benefit of full information. 290
Even questions with respect to the most fundamental issues involved
in securitization persist among market participants as well as courts. As
recently as 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
in Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmefl91 addressed the question of
whether the property claimed by a sale transferee was part of the trans
feror's bankruptcy estate and thus subject to the interests of the creditors
of the transferor's estate. Octagon involved a series of transactions result
ing in the transfer of an interest in the proceeds of certain gas sales made
by Poll Gas Systems, Inc. (Octagon's predecessor in interest). 292
Following the filing of debtor Poll Gas System's bankruptcy petition, the
court was asked to determine whether the interest in the proceeds was
property of Poll's Chapter 11 bankruptcy estate?93
The Tenth Circuit misunderstood the nature of the bankrupt debtor's
asset transfer and took issue with the lower courts' 294 summary rejection

of card issuers is to reduce their capital and loan-loss reserve requirements," said George Salem, senior
vice-president ofGerard Klauer Mattison. Brian Caplen, Financial Shocks: Where Next?, EUROMONEY,
Sept. 15, 1996, at 54, available in 1996 WL 11120815.
290. See supra nole 201. The lack of adequale disclosure requirements for ABS issuances is a
current concern of market participants, and the SEC is presently considering more stringent disclosure
requirements to provide more infonnation and time for investors to evaluate new ABS issuances. See
supra nole 163.
291. 995 F.2d 948 (lOth Cir. 1993).
292. See id. at 951-52.
293. See id. at 952. The parties 10 Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer were not involved in a classic
securitization. but in fact a much more complex series of transactions; however, the same issues with
respect 10 the nature ofasset transfers were implicaled. Uniled StaleS DistrictJudge Lee R. West staled
in his order that although the gas sale interest is most often described as an "overriding royalty
inlerest," Bankruptcy Judge Ryan found this description to be incorrect in the absence of any
underlying oil and gas leasehold estale. See In re Meridian Reserve, Inc., No. 88..()6519, at s-7
( Bankr. W.D. Okla. July 26, 1991) (order granting inlervenor-plaintiffRimmer's motion for summary
judgment) (on ftle with the Texas Law Review).
294. The bankruptcy court held that the Rimmer lnlerest was not part of Poll's bankruptcy estate.
See In re Meridian Reserve, Inc., No. 88..()6519, at 5-7 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. July 26, !991) (order
granting inlervenor-plaintiff Rimmer's motion for summary judgment) (on ftle with the Texas Law
Review). In its order outlining its conclusions of law, the court staled that a practical construction of
the conveyances, as well as the usage of the lerm "overriding royalty," led it 10 conclude that the
parties intended to convey a "separate, distinct and proportionale ownership right to the future cash
proceeds from gas sale," and as such, the inlerest held by Rimmer was for the benefit of Rimmer, not
the bankruptcy estale. Id. at 6. The bankruptcy court further rejecled the debtor's conclusion that an
analysis under Article 9 was relevant 10 the decision, stating that Article 9 does not delermine, in the
face of a conflict, whether or not art item of personal propeey is part of a debtor's bankruptcy esiale.
Id. at 6-7. The District Court for the Weslem District of Oklahoma summarily aff!Inted the decision
of the bankruptcy court, see In re Meridian Reserve, Inc., No. 88-06519 (W.O. Okla. Jan. 22, 1992)
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of an analysis of the respective parties' rights and interests under Article
9.295 The court observed that, pursuant to section 541 of the Bankruptcy
Code, a bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. "296 Relying
upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of the definition of an "estate" in
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. ;m the Octagon court concluded that,
because property of the estate includes property subject to a security
interest, and because the statutory scheme governing security interests
governs sales of accounts, the accounts thus sold remain the property of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate. 298
It was error for the Octagon court to conclude, in reliance on what it
perceived to be the holding of Whiting Pools, that the sold assets were
property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 299 Although Whiting Pools

(order affinning the bankruptcy court's summary judgment) (on file with the Texas lAw Review), and
Octagon appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit.
295. The Tenth Circuit concluded as a threshold matter that the transferred interest was an account
under Article 9 and observed that. notwithstanding the fact that the "transactions giving rise to [the]
account were not intended to secure a debt," the sale of properry is covered by Article 9. Octagon,
995 F.2d at 955. Because narural gas, once extracted and sold, is a "good," the right to receive
payment from the sale of that good is an "account." See id. at 954-55. Article 9 defines an account
as "any right to payment for goods sold •.• which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper
••••" OKLA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-106 (West Supp. 1998). The court observed that § 9
102(1)(b) "states that Article 9 applies 'to any outright sale ofaccounts.'" Octagon. 995 F.2d at 955
(citations omined). Further, the term "security interest" as defmed by Article 9 expressly includes
"any interest of a buyer of accounts," and "secured parry" includes "a buyer [to whom] accounts ..•
have been sold." Jd. The Official Comments to§ 9-102 of the Oklahoma Commercial Code explain

that in the case of commercial rmaneing on the basis of accounts. "'the distinction between a security
transfer and sale is blurred, and a sale of such properry is therefore covered by[§ 9-102](1)(b) whether
intended for security or not. . . . The buyer then is treated as a secured party, and his interest as a
security interest." OKLA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-102 cmt. 2 (West Supp. 1998).
296. Octagon, 995 F.2d at 955 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § S41(a)(1) (1988)).
297. 462 U.S. 198 (1983). The Whiting Pools Court. citing both the legislative history and the
language of Bankruptcy Code§ 541(a)(l), noted that the provision is "intended to include in the estate
any properry made available to the estate by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code." ld. at 205.
The Court stated that, in order to "filcilitate the rehabilitation of the debtor's business, all of the
debtor"s properry must be included in the reotganization estate," including properry "in which a
creditor has a security interest." Id. at 203. The Court continued by noting that Congress could have
specifically excluded properry subject to a security interest from the bankruptcy estate, but "chose
instead to include such properry in the estate and to provide secured creditors with 'adequate protection'
for their interests." ld. at 204. Because properry encumbered by a securiry interest is included in a
debtor's bankruptcy estate, regardless of whether it is in the possession of the debtor or another parry,
the truStee has the authority pursuant to § 542(a) to demand that the parry in possession of estate prop
erry rum such properry over to the debtor's estate. See id. at 208. Failure to perfect a sale of accounts
will bring the transferred accounts under the authority of§§ 544(a),541(3), and S50(a). See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 541(3), 544(a). 550(a) (1994). Failure to perfect a transfer, however, will bring the transferred
properry under the authority of§§ 541(3), 544(a)(1), and 550(a). See id.
298. Su Octagon, 99S F.2d at 954-56.
299. The Supreme Coun in Whiting Pools addressed a siruation in which the United States held
a rax lien on all of the properry of Whiting. The IRS had seized and was planning to sell Whiting
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sketches the contours of what property should properly be included in a
debtor's bankruptcy estate,300 the case does not stand for the proposition
that all property in the possession of other parties, which Article 9
governs, is part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, regardless of the cir
cumstances of the transfer. 301

Pools's property to satisfy the tax lien. As a step in enforcing this lien, the United States seized all of
Whiting's property, anticipating a sale of the property. Before the sale could take place, however,
Whiting filed a petition in bankrupll:y under Chapter II. Thus, at the time of the bankrupll:y filing,
the United States had both possession of the property and a lien on it, but not title to iL The United
States then claimed that the seized property was not properly of Whiting's bankruptcy estate. The
Supreme Court held that the IRS was required to return the properly to Whiting Pools as debtor-in
possession under § 542(a) of the Bankrupley Code because Whiting retained a significant interest in the
properly: its residual rigbt of redemption. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 199-201, 20<Hl6.
300. The Court further observed that !he Code safeguards security interests by providing secured
creditors with adequate protection. Because the proecdural devices available to the IRS to protect and
satisfy its liens are analogous to those available to private secured creditors when the debtor files for
bankrupll:y, § 542 of the Bankruptcy Code simply requires the creditor to "seek protection of its
interest according to the congressionally established bankrupll:y proecdures, rnther than by withholding
the seized property from the debtor's efforts to reorganize." Id. at 212.
301. Moreover, not only do the slate Jaw provisions of Article 9 treat the grnnting uf a security
interest differently from a sale of accounts, but the tenn security interest is not defined in the same way
under the Bankruptcy Code as it is in Article 9. The Bankrupll:y Code's definition of security interest
does not include the interest of a purchaser of accounts, whereas § 1-201(37) of the UCC slates that
the tenn "security interest" also "includes any interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which
is subject to Article 9." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1994). Section 101(51) of the Bankruptcy Code defines
security interest as a lien created by an agreement. See II U.S.C. § 101(51).
Thus, as stated above, for the limited purpose of providing for a notice mechanism to third
parties, Article 9's filing system applies to both sales of accounts and borrowings secured by accounts;
Article 9 does not conttol, however, which assets constitute properly of the bankruptcy estate. This
is detennincd with reference to the Bankrupll:y Code provisions.
Furlber, the Court in Whiting Pools did not address the issue of under what circumstances IIliDS
ferred properly is deemed part of a transferor's bankruptcy estate, nor the issue of when, and under
what circumstances, the trustee bas the power and authority to avoid certain pre-bankrupll:y IIliDSfers
of properly and recover such transferred properly for the benefit of the estate. Although it is true that
§ 9-102 of the UCC requires the filing of a notice in the fonn of a UCC-1 fmancing statement in con
nection with the sale of accounts in the same way debtors file financing statements giving notice of the
grnnt of collateral, this does not suggest that the properly sold is governed by the provisions of Article
9 for all purposes and in all circumstances. Section 9-102 requires perfection of a buyer's interest in
both accounts and chattel paper. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (1994). This filing requirement serves the
purpose of announcing to third parties that the property identified in the financing statement is no
longer available to third·pany creditors, either as coUatetal or, if the third-party creditors have gener
ally unsecured clainrs regarding the debtor's bankrupll:y, as part of the banknrpll:y estate. Article 9
clearly distinguishes, in many instances, between the sale of assets and the gll!Dt of a security interesL
For example, both § 9-502(2) and § 9-504(2) provide that, if the transaction between parties is a sale
of accounts, the debtor is not entitled to any surplus and is not liable for any deficiency, absent an
agreement to the contruy. Thus, Article 9 distinguishes in certain commercial conteXts a sale of assets
from the gll!Dt ofa security interest in connection with a Joan. See In re Southwest Freight Lines, Inc.,
100 B.R. 55!, 535 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989) (holding that accounts receivable were not part of the bank
ruptcy estate because the debtor did not retain an interest in them); In re National Equip. & Mold
Corp., 64 B.R. 239, 2;45 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (holding that a debtor relinquished his o'l'lletsbip
rights in accounts receivable because he did not retain an interest in the property); U.C.C. §§ 9-502(2),
9-504{2).
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Furthermore, the cases-In re Contractors Equipment Supply Co., 3112
Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 303 and In re
Evergreen lblley Resort, Inc. 304-have all more squarely addressed these
issues and each suggests that the outright sale of accounts by a debtor prior
to its bankruptcy filing places it beyond the reach of the trustee and the
bankruptcy estate. 305 As logical as this analysis and conclusion may be,

302. 861 F.2d241 (9th Cir. 1988). In Contraelors Equipment, thedebiOr, ConttaciOrs Equipment,
granted its credi10r, Citibank, a security interest in all of its accounts receivable, including any furure
accounts. Citibank then notified an account debtor, Pima, that it must make its payments directly to
Cinbank. Following this proper notification pursuant to§ 9-318 and§ 9-502, the debtor, ConttaciOrs
Equipment, filed for banlauptcy. Following the bankruptcy filing, Pima began making its payments
directly 10 the bankrupt debtor. Cinbank then filed a complaint against the account debtor in state
court, alleging that Pima's payments 10 the debiOr were in violation of the provisions of Article 9. In
response, the account debiOr filed an adversary proceeding in the banlauptcy court, requesting a
declaration that it discharged its obligation by paying the debiOr in full. The Bankruptcy Court granted
summary judgment in favor of Pima, holding that Citibank had only a security interest in the account
receivable and that the account receivable was property of the estate. The district court affirmed the
decision of the bankruptcy court. The Ninth Circuit held that because the assignment involved a

security interest and not an outright sale of accounts, the fuwre accounts receivable were assets of the
bankruptcy estate, pursuant 10 § 541 of the Banlauptcy Code. The court suggested that the accounts
receivable would not be part of the bankruptcy estate if the accounts were sold outright to Citibank
prior 10 the bankruptcy filing. See id. at 242-45.
303. 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979). The issue in Major's Furniture was whether the transfer of
receivables was a true sale or a ttansfer of collateral for a loan. The court held that all relevant factors
surrounding the circumstances of ttansfer must be examined and that the parties' characterization of

the transfer was not determinative. The coun found that the transfer in this case was for security and
not for sale because of the retention of risk, including full recourse, by the ttansferor. See id.
304. 23 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982). The Evergreen Valley banlauptcy court further defined
the indicia of collateral granted in connection with a secured loan, as opposed to an outright sale, in
a bankruptcy context. See id. at 661. These indicia include: (I) the retention by the ttansferee of the
rights 10 pursue a deficiency, (2) acknowledgement by the ttansferee that its rights in the property
would be extinguished if the debt were paid through some other source, (3) a requirement that the
ttansferee account 10 the transferor for any su~plus, (4) evidence that the ttansferor's debt was not
reduced on account of the ttansfer, and (5) conttact language expressing the intent that thettansfer was
for security only. See id.
305. The Permanent EdiiOrial Board (PEB) for the Uniform Commercial Code has amended UCC
§ 9-102 comment 2 as follows:
Neither Section 9-102 nor any other provision of Article 9 is intended to prevent the
transfer of ownership of accounts or chattel paper. The determination of whether a
particular ttansfer of accounts or chattel paper constituteS a sale or a ttansfer for security
pnl]JOSCS (such as in connection with a loan) is not governed by Article 9. Article 9
applies both to sale of accounts or chattel paper and loans secured by accounts or chattel
paper primarily to inco1p0rate Article 9's perfection rules. The usc of terminology such
as "security interest" 10 include the interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper,
"secured party" 10 include a buyer of accounts or chattel paper, "debtor" to include a
seller of accounts or chattel paper, and "collateral" 10 include accounts or chattel paper
that have been sold is intended solely as a drafting technique 10 achieve this end and is

not relevant to the sale or secured transaction detennination.
U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 2~see Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale ofAcco~~Qts and
Chatlel Paper Under the U. C. C. and the Effeas of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Prindpl•. 26
CONN. L. REv. 397, 456 n.268 (1994).
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not all courts have understood the nature of asset transfers in a bankruptcy
context. 306
The Octagon court got it so wrong 307 that the decision sparked the
UCC Article 9 Drafting Committee to propose an amendment to the UCC
specifically addressing the issue of whether or not accounts sold to a third
party remain subject to the seller's bankruptcy proceeding. 308
Furthermore, on April 8, 1996, the Oklahoma Commercial Code was
amended309 to provide that Article 9 "does not prevent the transfer of
ownership of accounts or chattel paper" and that "[t]he determination of
whether a particular transfer of accounts or chattel paper constitutes a sale
or a transfer for security purposes is not governed by" Article 9. 310 As
predicted by market participants, the Octagon decision has not had the
effect of chilling the creativity of tenacious structured-finance
originators; 311 these transactions continue to proliferate. 312 The decision
does illustrate, however, some of the uncertainties that remain with respect
to even the most fundamental issues raised by asset securitization.

306. Section 361(3) of the Bankrupley Code authorizes the trustee to propose adequate protection
by giving the secured claimant any fonn of relief that will result in the realization of the "indubitable

equivalence.. of the claimant's interest in the property. This phrase originated in an opinion written
by Learned Hand. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(c) (1994); In re Murel Holding Corp .• 75 F.2d 941, 942 {2d
Cir. 1935).
307. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER TilE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE f 4.04[5] (rev. ed. 1993) (arguing that Octagon is wrong because, if a financing
statement is filed by the buyer of accounts receivable, then the accounts should be removed from the
bankruptcy estate); Debtor's Estate Doesn't Have Interest in Account that was Sold, Bll)ler Asserts,
Bankr. L. Daily (BNA) (Nov. 18, 1993), available in Westlaw, 11118/93 BLD; Thomas S. Kiriakos
eta!., Bankruptcy, in I SECURITlZATION OF FINANCIAL ASsETS, supra note 5, § 5, at 5·1, -32 to -33
(arguing that the Octagon decision is "clearly incorrect" because it misconstrues the UCC and is
inconsistent with other court decisions); Steven L. Schwarcz, Octagon Gas Ruling Creates Tunnoil for
Co/TU1lercial and Asset-Based Finance, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 4, 1993, at I, 2 (criticizing the Octagon
opinion on the grounds that it is contraty to the UCC and other court decisions).
308. See U.C.C. § 9·60I(d) (Discussion Draft No.2, 1997).
309. Act of Apr. 8, 1996, ch. 56, 1996 Okla. Sess. Laws 224.
310. OKLA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-102(4) (West Supp. 1998).
311. Recently, an originator located in the Tenth Circuit designed a securitization transaction
intended to avoid as a matter of law the effects of Octagon, which has not been overruled. The crea
tive deal strucrure dictated that the laws of lllinois-not the laws of Utah, where the originator's prin
cipal place of business is located-should govern the rights and responsibilities of the parties. This
choice of law was based upon § 1-105 of the Utah Commercial Code which states that, "Except as
provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this State and also to another
state or nation, the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation
shall govern their rights and duties." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1-105 (1953). Counsel for the origina
tor delivered a conflict-of-law opinion under Utah law which concluded that Illinois law should govern
the true sale status of the asset transfer based upon the fact that the SPC was. established in lllinois,

transaction payments were made and received in Dlinois, and certain transaction records were kept in
lllinois. The opinion further concluded that under lllinois law, a non-Tenth Circuit state, the transfer
of assets from the originator to the SPC was a true sale. See Jack Wagler, Overcoming Octagon: Part
II, AssET SALES REP., Oct. 21, 1996, at I, available in 1996 WL 5618294.
312. See supra note 33.
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VI. Conclusion
It has been said that the "majority of innovations on Wall Street die
young. "313 An innovation that fulls within an exception to this maxim is
asset securitization, whose market has been increasing in volume every
year since the first issuance in the mid-1980s. 314 It is clear that a great
many people are making a great deal of money from the billions of dollars
of ABS that are brought to market every year. It is equally clear that there
remain unanswered questions with respect to the economic and social effi
ciency of structured finance transactions.
The most modest conclusion that may be drawn is that structured fin
ance's efficiency is unproven. A bolder assertion, and one this Article pre
dicts will be supported by empirical evidence, is that securitization is
inefficient. 315 When value is diverted from nonadjusting creditors to
parties with greater knowledge, resources, and opportunity to bargain et
ante for greater leverage to encourage voluntary repayment (and in the
event of bankruptcy, to guarantee priority repayment), then this value rep
resents a distributional inefficiency. Moreover, unsecured creditors of
securitizing originators do not receive the benefits of protection from the
phenomenon of debtor misbehavior that they receive when their debtor uses
its assets as security for credit. In the absence of such protections, unse
cured creditors are more vulnerable to the risk of nonpayment as well as
the risk of debtor's bankruptcy.
Presumably, even if the efficiency of securitization is ever proven to
unanimous satisfaction, the distributional consequences of some parties
being preferred over others will result in inequities. Such consequences
will continue to fuel the flame of commercial law scholars, practitioners,
bankruptcy trustees, and eventually courts and legislatures concerned about
"stronger" market participants benefitting at the expense of their weaker
counterparts-the unsecured creditors. If this prediction is realized at a
time when the volume and type of securitizing originators in bankruptcy
mirrors the profile of the newest securitization transaction originators, the
ABS market will be subject to a drastic adjustment. Investors will lose the
value of their investments as the previously transferred assets are returned
to the originator's bankruptcy estate.
Empirical data is needed to conclusively demonstrate the harm experi
enced by the unsecured creditors of securitizing originators. Such a study
would track dollar values with respect to securitization's benefits and its

313. John Thackray, Corporate Finance: The Golden Age ofInnovation, FORBES, Apr. 29, 1985,
at 136, 146 (special advenising supplement).
314. Ste supra note 33. ·
315. For a discussion oflhe type of data Jhat should be analyzed in colUlection with a sllldy of Jhe
lhird·parJy effects of securitization t:tansactions, see supra note 11.
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costs to third parties. This empirical examination will have to be con
ducted over time to observe and quantify the market effects of widespread
originator bankruptcies.

